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PAINFUL DISPARITIES, PAINFUL REALITIES
Amanda C. Pustilnik✝
Legal doctrines and decisional norms treat chronic claims pain differently than
other kinds of disability or damages claims because of bias and confusion about
whether chronic pain is real. This is law’s painful disparity. Now, breakthrough
neuroimaging can make pain visible, shedding light on these mysterious ills.
Neuroimaging shows these conditions are, as sufferers have known all along, painfully
real. This Article is about where law ought to change because of innovations in
structural and functional imaging of the brain in pain. It describes cutting-edge
scientific developments and the impact they should make on evidence law and disability
law, and, eventually the law’s norms about pain. It suggests that pain neuroimaging
will solve current legal problems and also open the door to reconsiderations of law’s
treatment of other subjective phenomena like mental states and emotions, going to the
theoretical heart of legal doctrines about body and mind.
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INTRODUCTION
Pain is a legal, philosophical, and human conundrum. Pain is at once a physical
state and an emotional experience, and thus exists at the nexus of body and mind;
nowhere is the law’s casual dualism between mind and body more uneasily maintained
than in questions of pain. Legal rights, proscriptions, and statuses turn on the presence
or absence of pain, and its amount: Questions involving pain span legal domains from
tort to torture, from Constitutional law to administrative regulation. Pain accounts for
hundreds of billions of dollars of direct economic costs and lost productivity annually
— and yet, pain is largely invisible, unquantifiable, and often grossly misunderstood,
leading to unnecessary suffering on the part of people whose pain is not credited and to
unnecessary expense when the legal and medical systems function inefficiently or the
wrong claimants are compensated.
What would the law do differently if it could see pain, as is increasingly possible
through new neuroimaging technologies? In some domains, law might not change very
much at all: In a prior article, Pain as Fact and Heuristic, I argued that certain legal
doctrines and statuses that appear to be framed in terms of pain’s presence and amount
cannot be understood or improved by better measurement of pain.1 Rather, debates
carried out superficially through competing statements about pain — like what practices
constitute torture, whether a pre-viable fetus feels pain, or whether certain execution
protocols violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual
punishment — are coded conversations about values, and not, as they purport to be,
about physical facts. Thus pain imaging and measurement, although fascinating, would
misdirect rather than illuminate, allowing decision-makers to dodge fundamental
normative issues about the relationship between citizen and state, person and person.
In other domains, however, the imaging of pain might change law a great deal.
Indeed, it ought to change a great deal. This Article is about where law ought to change
because of innovations in pain science, brought about primarily through structural and
functional imaging of the brain in pain. Structural and functional brain imaging, along
with other brain- and non-brain based research modalities, have in the last two decades
1

Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral
Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (2012).
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fundamentally transformed the way doctors and scientists understand chronic pain.
From an elusive and speculative condition, often characterized by treating doctors and
by the legal system as a form of hysteria, malingering, or fraud, researchers and
clinicians now understand many chronic pain conditions to involve neurological
signaling disorders or even to constitute brain disorders in their own right.
Brain science can now begin to show why certain relatively trivial injuries may
give rise to what looks like “excess” pain, why injuries that have apparently healed may
result in life-long pain, and why some people develop primary chronic pain disorders in
the absence of any injury at all. Structural imaging of the brain in pain shows that
particular chronic pain conditions result in the reshaping of certain brain structures, with
the degree of brain difference (or damage) correlating with the amount and duration of
the sufferer’s pain. Functional imaging shows reorganization in the brain’s default
network, how the brain engages in unconscious activity. Moreover, these observed
structural and functional changes are explanatory: The regions affected map onto the
symptomatology that researchers observe and of which patients complain. Chronic pain
is, as its sufferers have known all along, painfully real.
This revolution in brain-pain sciences ought to change the law in at least two
important areas that are the subject of this Article: disability law and evidence law.
Chronic pain is the single largest category of disability under the Social Security
Disability (SSD) regime.2 Yet, the regulations about what constitutes disability are in
places silent about pain and in other places confoundingly circular. The Social Security
Administration recognized these problems and convened a panel of experts in 1984 to
clarify regulations relating to pain. The panel issued the recommendation in 1986 that
the matter required further study, pending improvements in brain and pain sciences.
And since 1986, there the situation has remained: awaiting study. Pain science, this
Article argues, is now sufficiently developed for policymakers and scholars to improve
the law’s treatment of pain in important ways, including to revise the SSD regime
relating to chronic pain.
If the current SSD regulations are lacking, judicial interpretations thereof have
done little to improve them: In their efforts to gap-fill, circuit judges in federal courts
2

42 U.S.C. § 423 et seq. (2012).
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across the United States, who hear appeals of administrative disability denials, have
developed their own interpretations of when chronic pain can and cannot constitute a
disability. These standards vary by circuit from under-defined and over-permissive to
draconian. The same medical evidence leads to different outcomes based purely on
where an appeal is taken, violating the principle of horizontal equity.
Some judicial interpretations of the regulations incorporate a pejorative view of
the chronic pain claimant as suspect, as not genuinely disabled, as seeking recognition
for emotional wounds in the guise of physical complaints.

Judges and other

commentators who hold such views are channeling a deep cultural current, as the
history of pain in law and medicine is one of doubt about pain’s reality, and of
construing or constructing the pain sufferer as hysterical.

Although pain always

necessarily includes an emotional component, the view of the interrelationship between
pain and emotion that remains current in law is several decades out of step with medical
and psychiatric understandings of chronic pain. When apprised of new pain science,
judges may choose a different approach to these cases:

Circuit court judges are

uniquely placed to change judicial interpretations of pain-related disability to conform
with current science, so that disability determinations can be more consistent and more
fair, even before SSA acts to revise its regulations.
Chronic pain is also at issue in many litigated matters. These matters may be
administrative, as in disability claims, but may also proceed under the auspices of tort
law, ERISA, or workers’ compensation. Accordingly, judges and jurors frequently
need to evaluate evidence of chronic pain. Direct evidence relating to a claimant’s
medical condition is already common in these kinds of proceedings. This Article argues
that expert testimony grounded in pain neuroimaging, and neuroimages themselves,
ought to be admissible for certain limited purposes: To educate judges and jurors about
the nature of chronic pain conditions and to inform them as to the causes,
manifestations, and likely prognoses for these conditions. Educating judges and jurors
is crucial because of prevalent misunderstandings about these conditions, which can
distort outcomes in both directions.
Evidence, although a notionally a rule-based enterprise, is highly normative.
Determinations about what evidence is relevant and reliable, and thus admissible, take

5

place against background expectations or schemas:

How well does the evidence

presented match what the decision-makers expect to see and believe to be credible?
Evidence embraces the narrative character of the trial and extends to the evaluative
process of judges and juries. These “soft” aspects of evidence may be more influential
than the rules themselves in shaping litigation and its outcomes.

Background

expectations or schemas may be informative; they also may mislead. In cases involving
chronic pain, jurors and judges alike may hold mistaken beliefs about chronic pain’s
causes, presentation, and persistence. Introducing educative evidence about chronic
pain itself could have an important debiasing role, equivalent to steps some jurisdictions
have taken to permit expert testimony debunking other common but erroneous beliefs,
like the now-discredited beliefs about the infallibility of eye-witness identification or
the relationship between prompt reporting and credibility in sexual assault cases.
Drawing on narrative theory, evidence theory, and behavioral economic accounts of
decision-making, this Article recommends ways in which neuroimaging evidence could
improving accuracy in trials by changing the background or default expectations of
judges and fact-finders. Turning to black letter or “hard” aspects of evidence law, this
Article argues that aggregate pain neuroimaging evidence ought to be admissible under
the federal, state, and administrative evidence regimes for certain, limited purposes.
However, decision-makers should not expect claimants to produce brain scans, nor
should claimants be allowed to do so. Brain scanning technology is not a fraud-o-meter,
pain-o-meter, or mind-reading machine, but a tool for increasing understanding about
these complex phenomena.
Other areas where law grapples with pain are outside the scope of this Article.
Tort law doctrines relating to pain and suffering and to the vast and important issue of
emotional pain may be ripe for reconsideration as well. These important issues merit
their own treatment in future work.
*
*
*
Part I of this Article describes the state of the law and legal culture relating to
chronic pain. Examining treatises, practice guides, and court opinions, it shows how
outdated, medically-flawed, and pejorative notions about chronic pain affect legal
decision-making.

6

Part II presents current research on chronic pain as a set of neurologicallyinvolved disorders and discusses how neuroimaging may improve legal understandings
of chronic pain, as well as diagnosis and treatment.

Focusing on structural and

functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), it surveys the field and incorporates
information from interviews with leading pain researchers.
Parts III and IV turn to the ways in which this new science should change two
key areas of legal doctrine and practice. Part III analyzes Social Security Disability
regulations, showing how current neuroimaging research could resolve significant
doctrinal and applied problems. It outlines proposals to reform regulations that define
when chronic pain constitutes disability, to modify judicial interpretations of the
regulations, and to educate adjudicators about contemporary pain science.
Part IV turns to evidence law. Exploring evidence law theory, it shows how
narrative expectations, culturally received norms, and cognitive predispositions like
confirmation bias contribute to poor outcomes for chronic pain claimants, and shows
how pain neuroimaging could be used to modify decision-makers’ beliefs and
perceptions.

It then proposes where neuroimaging should, and should not, be

admissible in cases that involve chronic pain.

This section also emphasizes that

functional MRI should not currently be admissible to prove or disprove a chronic pain
condition in any individual case.
I.
THE LAW’S LEGACY NOTIONS OF CHRONIC PAIN
“[W]hile a ‘fundamental reassessment of chronic pain’ has occurred in the
scientific literature, this reassessment has gone unnoticed in the law. Until
courts rethink the prevailing model of pain … its sufferers will remain
under suspicion as latter-day hysterics and malingerers.” 3
The well-documented but declining historical bias within the medical field4

3

Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 288 (2005) (quoting Jean Marx,
Prolonging the Agony, 305 SCI. 326 (2004)).

4

See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against Women in
the Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 13, 23 n.1 (2001) (referencing medical journal articles).
Initiatives by NIH, the American Society of Pain Medicine, and special provisions under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, among others, aim to combat under treatment of chronic
pain and stereotypes leading to misdiagnosis. Pub. L. 111–148, § 4305, 124 Stat. 119, 584–87 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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against chronic pain patients remains vital within legal fields.

5

Negative

characterizations of people with chronic pain permeate legal culture. While many legal
actors are sensitive to pain-related issues, a range of legal sources portray such
claimants as primarily mentally ill, and as unstable, attention-seeking, or outright
fraudulent. These characterizations appear in sources ranging from standard treatises to
statements by administrative law judges to the language and decisional standards in
published opinions. This section presents a sample of these antique notions, across
documents and sources that reflect and construct legal culture or that constitute law in
themselves.
A.

Treatises, Practice Guides, and Expert Opinions

Treatises like American Jurisprudence and the ALR are not sources law, yet
they play an important role as repositories of legal culture and sources of norm
transmission. Current editions of these treatises continue to repeat nostrums about
chronic pain that medically are a half-century or more out of date. Among the first
things that Am. Jur. Proof of Facts has to say in its section entitled “Modern
physiopsychological concepts of pain sensations” is this: “the subconscious needs of the
plaintiff-patient” can cause him or her to “exaggerate pain,” particularly when
“motivated by prospects of gain.”6 Chronic pain conditions that do not arise from an
obvious, ongoing injury may indicate major mental illness, like “schizophrenia,” or just
indicate that the claimant is plagued by “neuroses.” 7 The “emotionally disturbed
individual” may use complaints of chronic pain as “a call for help,” communicating that
he or she “feels unloved or abandoned.”8 Frequently, the treatise authoritatively states,
people who raise legal complaints of chronic pain have the “desire” to be a “victim” and
“enjoy the presence of chronic pain.”9
To say, as Am. Jur. does, that a claimant exaggerates her pain for gain is not
5

See, e.g., Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right to Pain
Relief, 24 J. LEGAL MEDICINE 495 (2003); Diane Hoffman, Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the
Use of Opioid Analgesics, in REGIONAL ANESTHESIA & PAIN MEDICINE (Joseph M. Neal & James P.
Rothwell eds., 2007).

6

I. Alfred Breckler, Whether a Plaintiff Has Sustained Pain & Suffering, in AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 2D,
§ 3 (2007).

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id. § 10.
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precisely to call her a cheat and a liar; but to ascribe the pain to her “subconscious”
desire for recognition or her enjoyment of being “a victim” does mark her as at the very
least untrustworthy — which is critical in legal contests, where credibility is key.10
Indeed, asserting that chronic pain is a symptom of mental illness creates a presumption
that a person who complains of chronic pain is mentally ill; mental illnesses can
undermine credibility because they affect aspects of perception, cognition, and memory.
Further, in legal matters where causation of pain is at issue, as in tort and workers’
compensation, these putative associations between chronic pain and mental illness sever
the link between the claimant’s pain and the external cause she alleges for it. The
problem is not the alleged accident or the injury, but the claimant’s mental state.
The prominence of these statements about the relationship between mental
illness and chronic pain is noteworthy, too. The treatise does not lead with biological
explanations of pain and then note psychological influences in some cases of mental
disorder. Rather, it leads with the psychiatric account. The message is: Chronic pain is
most likely a manifestation of major mental illness, or at least a neurotic enjoyment of
victimhood.
Practice guides, too, perpetuate the same negative characterizations. Writing for
The Social Security Reporter, an important journal of administrative law, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) who adjudicates disability claims advises other
adjudicators to consider first the possibility of “converted mental conflict” when
assessing cases involving chronic pain.11 Whether a claimant suffers from “organic”
pain versus “psychogenic” pain “should influence adjudication of entitlement quite
differently.” 12 In this judge’s view, psychiatric pain should not be compensable;
“rewarding” the claimant for the psychiatric condition only perpetuates the person’s
disability rather than forcing him or her to confront and fix the disability’s emotional
causes.
Recognizing that psychogenic pain and non-psychogenic pain can be difficult to
10

Id. § 3.

11

Patrick D. Halligan, Credibility, Chronic Pain, and Converted Mental Conflict: Some Distinctions for
Adjudicators, 38 SOC. SEC. REP. SER. 859, 860 (1993) (Administrative Law Judge of the Social Security
Administration, serving in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.).

12

Id. at 859.

9

distinguish, the author provides this surprising guidance for adjudicators: “Severe and
persistent pain despite good compliance with pain treatments are [sic] the initial positive
indicators” of psychogenic pain. 13 Seeking treatment from numerous doctors also
indicates psychogenic (non-organic) pain.14 Poor compliance with treatment or failure
to seek treatment indicates fraud.15 This creates a perfect Catch-22: If the claimant is
treatment-compliant and seeks treatment from many sources, but does not improve, she
is not mentally, not physically, ill (because otherwise treatment would work). If she is
not compliant or does not seek out many avenues of treatment, she is malingering
(because a person in real pain would seek treatment and comply with it). And if a
claimant complies with treatment and does achieve relief, she is not disabled.
No adjudicator ought simultaneously to believe that seeking treatment and
failing to seek treatment signal the same psychiatric disorder. This is equivalent to
simultaneously believing p and not-p, the definition of logical contradiction. So how
does one make sense of this ALJ’s contention? The paradox can be resolved in the
following way: If treatment-refractory pain is itself a sign of mental illness, then any
particular behavior — complying with treatment or not complying with treatment — is
irrelevant to whether the claimants’ pain is “real,” because the very premise is that the
pain is never real.
B.

Judicial Opinions

Courts struggle with questions relating to the reality and verifiability of chronic
pain. At times, federal district and circuit courts chastise ALJs for denying medically
well-substantiated disability claims grounded in chronic pain. At other times, however,
federal and administrative judges display extreme skepticism about such conditions. In
all cases, it is clear that courts would benefit from greater understanding of these
complicated conditions. Among other problems, adjudicators may reject chronic pain
claims that are not supported by X-rays, MRIs, or other similar imaging technologies,
even though such technologies are often irrelevant to the diagnosis. They also may
reject claims because they believe that the individual’s pain is greater than it should be
13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

10

given the underlying disease or injury, substituting their own judgment for medical
evidence. The common thread among these issues is that of disbelief of the chronic
pain claimant, even at times in the face of overwhelming corroborating evidence.
Courts often reject claims of chronic pain that are not supported by visible
evidence of painful abnormalities, even though the claims are medically wellsubstantiated. In Minor v. Commissioner of Social Security, claimant alleged disability
due to life-long chronic headaches exacerbated by post-concussion syndrome following
closed-head trauma sustained in a high-speed car accident.16 She endured dozens of
hospitalizations, several spinal and brain surgeries, and the implantation of a spinal pain
modulator.17 She also submitted evidence of some thirty diagnostic tests supporting her
diagnoses.18 Yet, the ALJ denied her claim, and district court affirmed, with both courts
noting that Minor did not present MRIs and venograms showing gross brain damage.19
However, as the appellate court noted, none of the claimant’s conditions could be
detected with these kinds of tests, a fact to which the agency’s examining expert had
testified. 20 Similarly, in Ketelboeter v. Astrue, the court rejected the claimant’s
assertion of severe chronic pain because “X-rays” did not “corroborate[] the claimed
increase in chest pain that [claimant] reported over time.”21 In cases where the ALJ has
discounted the medical evidence, the ALJ may also have impermissibly substituted his
or her judgment for the that of the physicians.
Judges’ insistence that claimants did not have disabling pain because they had
no abnormal X-rays or similar imaging shows their search for the smoking gun (a
bulging aneurism, a crushed pelvis), the visible thing that causes the pain.

This

manifests an attachment to the superseded peripheral injury model.22 Most chronic pain
is not caused by an anatomical abnormality, but by a functional neurological

16

513 Fed. Appx. 417 (6th Cir. 2013) (reciting history below).

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 433 (reversing holdings below).

20

Id. at 435.

21

550 F.3d 620, 653 (7th Cir. 2008).

22

See infra at II.A, discussing peripheral and central models of chronic pain.
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abnormality.23 Because claimants’ pain cannot be visualized, courts conclude it is not
real. Alternatively, these judges’ reasoning could run in the other direction: They
presume chronic pain claims are easy to fake or stem from hysteria, so even where
medical evidence is overwhelming (as with Minor), they credit no claim for which there
is no photographic evidence.
Closely related to the objective imaging problem is the problem of “excess
pain.” “Excess pain” is a legal term of art that applies to claims in which a decisionmaker concludes the claimant has more pain than is typical for a disease or injury, and
that the claimed level of pain is not supported by “objective” medical findings (like Xrays).24 No source defines the ostensibly correct amount of pain for each condition, as
the SSA recognizes that pain can be subjective and variable.25 Rather, judges are left to
determine whether claimants’ pain is excessive. They make this determination based in
part on medical evidence, but also based on their own judgment, against the background
of what they know or believe about chronic pain.26 Judges vary tremendously in what
they consider excessive pain, and so whether they find the complaint credible.
Garcia v. Colvin illustrates the suspicion and uncertainty related to chronic pain
that judges characterize as involving “excess” pain.27 In Garcia, a claimant with lupus,
colitis, a blood disorder, hepatitis C, abdominal hernia, and terminal cirrhosis of the
liver, who was taken off the transplant list because he was too ill to survive surgery,
claimed disability based on severe abdominal pain and fatigue related to his
conditions.28 Garcia’s doctors and an agency-appointed examiner concluded Garcia
was completely disabled.29

23

Id.

24

Ann K. Wooster, Standard and Sufficiency of Evidence When Evaluating Severity of Claimant's Pain in
Social Security Disability Case Under § 3(a)(1) of Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984,
42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(5)(A), 165 A.L.R. FED. 203, § 3 (2000) (defining “excess pain” as “pain not
supported by objective medical findings,” such as x-ray). See Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th
Cir. 1986) (defining “excess pain”; holding “Secretary is free to disbelieve that testimony [of excess pain]
but must make specific findings justifying that decision”) (internal citation omitted).

25

Social Security Ruling 88-13, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Pain and Other Symptoms (1988).

26

Wooster, supra note 24 at § 3, describing judicial process.

27

741 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013).

28

Id. at 759.

29

Id.
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Yet, an ALJ determined Garcia’s conditions did not support the level of pain he
alleged, and that his complaints of “excess pain” were “not credible.”30 The ALJ
concluded Garcia’s pain could not be severe because he could “rise to a standing
position, stoop, squat, and even walk heel to toe” in a brief examination.31 “[T]hese
competences,” he found, were “‘inconsistent with a finding of disability.’”32 The
district court affirmed.33 Essentially, the lower courts held that the claimant could not
be disabled by pain related to his terminal medical conditions unless he was unable to
move. They expressly discredited even the agency examiner as likely sympathetic to
him.34 They similarly dismissed Garcia’s partner’s testimony that he frequently awoke
at night crying from pain.35 The administrative court concluded that claimant “must
have been exaggerating” because he delayed seeking treatment;36 however, the record
showed he sought treatment as soon as he secured health insurance.37
On review, the appellate court described itself as “astonished” at the lower
courts’ determinations38 and “surprised that the Justice Department would defend such a
denial.”39 Garcia is an extreme case, but not an isolated one.40 It represents a general
problem: Many adjudicators doubt the reality of pain, even where the pain arises from
clear and determinable impairments like Garcia’s. Pain is even harder to substantiate
where it is the symptom of a primary pain condition. Claims of “excess pain” invite
decision-makers to decide how much pain is legitimate; the decision-maker may then
discount evidence inconsistent with his or her beliefs about pain and pain claimants,
30

Id.

31

Id. at 761.

32

Id. at 761.

33

Id. (citing district court opinion).

34

Id. at 762.

35

Id.

36

Id. (emphasis in original).

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 763.

40

See, e.g., Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing district court’s conclusion claimant
had “excess” pain; noting adjudicator may not substitute own judgment about how much pain is
appropriate for a particular injury); Shavin v. Com'r of Social Sec. Admin., 488 Fed. Appx. 223 (9th Cir.
2012); Hawkins v. First Union Corp., 326 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003); Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266
(6th Cir. 2009).

13

leading to disparities among chronic pain claimants and between chronic pain claimants
and others with different sources of disability.
Some courts implicitly or directly assert that chronic pain lacks reality, that it is,
itself, a mental illness. In Selian v. Astrue, for example, the Second Circuit chastised an
ALJ for “egregiously” substituting “her own lay opinion in place of medical testimony”
in discrediting all evidence of a chronic pain condition to hold that the claimant was not
disabled.41 In other cases, courts have held that chronic pain claims are unusually
subject to “abuse and malingering,” even where the pain derives from known conditions
like cancer,42 that chronic pain is a “mental disorder” and so not compensable under
ERISA,43 and that chronic pain patients with somatic disorder are “flamboyant . . .
exaggerators” whose pain can only be credited if one believes in a “medical
fantasyland” where the unreal is magically real.44
C.

The Psychoanalytic Legacy

The views expressed in treatises, practice guides, and judicial opinions that
people who complain of chronic pain are malingering or neurotic, or enjoy victimhood,
do not originate within legal culture. Such views have been received into legal culture
from earlier work in medical culture — particularly from psychoanalysis, which,
ironically, appears to retain more currency in law than in medicine.

Under the

psychoanalytic view, chronic pain exists because the hysterical subject unconsciously
produces symptoms as an expression of his or her psychological need. The subject has
some emotionally painful conflict that she cannot confront; the repressed conflict
manifests itself as a physical symptom, through a process called “somatization”
(literally, embodiment).45
41

Selian, 708 F.3d at 419.

42

Weitzenkamp v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 661 F.3d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing lower
court).

43

Lange v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 799 (9th
Cir. 1997).

44

Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 771 (7th Cir. 2004) (Coffey, J., dissenting).

45

The definition of somatization is itself in a state of some flux and controversy. The traditional
definition emphasizes its psychiatric character and the unreliability of people who receive this diagnosis:
“Somatization disorder is a psychiatric condition marked by multiple medically unexplained physical, or
somatic, symptoms. … [Patients] often use impressionistic and colorful language to describe their
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Chronic pain and psychoanalytic theory are intimately linked: Indeed, the famed
Anna O., the very patient who invented the psychoanalytic “talking cure” in
collaboration with her doctor Josef Breuer, sought treatment in part to help resolve her
chronic pain symptoms.46 Breuer and Sigmund Freud made her case the centerpiece of
their foundational work Studies in Hysteria, tracing her chronic pain to repressed
psychic conflict. The Anna O. case also embodies the magic trick of the talking cure:
Breuer claimed that once Anna O. identified and articulated her emotional conflicts, her
physical symptoms disappeared. Breuer’s claim was false: The real patient, named
Bertha Pappenheim, continued to suffer for many years but ultimately learned to live
with her pain. She went on to do important work in spite of great physical pain in
progressive politics, advocating for greater rights for workers and children.

Few

remember Bertha Pappenheim, while the literary construction known as Anna O.
remains famous.
The legacy of the Anna O. story is the enduring construction of pain
(particularly female pain) as fantasized and hysterical. It tells decision-makers to view
the person who complains of pain as suspect and emotionally disordered, and cautions
them not to fall into the trap of “rewarding” her by believing the pain is real, as this
reinforces the “syndrome.”
While the notion that psychological conflict could produce physical symptoms
did not originate with Freud and his school, it found its fullest expression and broadest
acceptance through Freud’s writings.47 Early members of Freud’s school asserted that a
symptoms …. While many symptoms resemble those associated with genuine diseases, symptoms
reported by people with somatization disorder are not.” http://www.minddisorders.com/PyZ/Somatization-disorder.html#ixzz2vVhL8JZY (last visited March 3, 2014). The National Institutes of
Health offers a more contemporary and less disparaging description of somatization, stating that
somatization is “a long-term (chronic) condition in which a person has physical symptoms that involve
more than one part of the body, but no physical cause can be found.” It describes somatization as
currently undergoing a reappraisal in which clinicians are identifying disorders of pain perception that
lead to the diffuse and nonspecific pain claims typical of patients labeled as somatizers.
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000955.htm (last visited March 3, 2014).
46

Bertha Pappenheim, described as Anna O. in Breuer’s case study, sought treatment with Breuer for
symptoms including paralysis, head and neck pain, and fugue states. The case has “bedeviled the history
of psychoanalysis ever since and been the subject of every conceivable diagnosis.” Edward Shorter,
What Was the Matter with Anna O.?, in FREUD UNDER ANALYSIS 23, 24 (Todd DuFresne & Paul Roazen
eds., 1997).

47

Describing the hysterical invalid, Freud asserts: “Her state of ill-health will have every appearance of
being objective and involuntary — the very doctor who treats her will bear witness to that fact; and for
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patient would convert psychic distress into a bodily ( “somatic”) symptom, relabeling
what Freud originally called “conversion hysteria.”48 Somatic disorder and conversion
disorder remain psychiatric diagnoses, although of steeply declining popularity: The
DSM-IV-TR cautions that these are uncommon conditions that ought not to be
diagnosed unless all non-psychiatric medical causes can be ruled out and only where the
pain symptoms do not follow any known medical criteria.49 This represents a shift from
DSM-III, which did not express any caveats or cautions; the transition from DSM-III to
DSM-IV shows the trend in psychiatry and general medicine to resist describing most
chronic pain as “all in the patient’s head.”50 New neuroimaging technologies now
enable researchers to understand chronic pain as “in the patient’s head” in a much more
literal and less dismissive way: As a set of pathologies grounded in central nervous
system processing, as discussed in the next Part.
II.

CURRENT PAIN SCIENCE AND THE POTENTIAL OF NEUROIMAGING

A.
Chronic Pain: An Overview
The myriad varieties of physical pain all fall into two categories: Acute or
chronic. Acute pain is sudden in onset and relatively brief in duration.51 It follows the
familiar nociceptive model: The body experiences an injury or insult (a sprained ankle,
a burst appendix), nerves in the affected area relay signals to the spinal cord and brain,
and the brain sends back the message “pain!” This kind of pain is adaptive: It signals
that the organism needs to pay attention to something right now. Because acute pain is
caused by peripheral input to the spinal cord and brain, once the peripheral injury
resolves, the pain goes away. Most physical pain is acute pain, and most acute pain
resolves relatively quickly.

that reason, she will not need to feel any conscious self-reproaches . . . .” Dora, in VII THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, 44–45 (1954–73).
48

Harold Merskey, The History of Pain and Hysteria, 8 NEUROREHABILITATION 157, 159 (1997)
(describing history of the term “somatization”)..

49

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-IVTR 446 (4th ed. rev. 2000).

50

Harold Merskey drove the change from DSM-III to DSM-IV. See Harold Merskey, Pain Disorder,
Hysteria or Somatization?, 9 PAIN RES. MGMT. 67, 71 (2004).

51

K.P. Grichnik & F.M. Ferrante, The Difference Between Acute and Chronic Pain, 58 MT. SINAI J. MED.
217 (1991).
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Chronic pain is fundamentally different. Even though chronic pain is defined as
pain lasting six months or longer, it is not just longer-lasting than acute pain. Rather,
chronic pain often has “a life of its own”: It often does not depend on continued
peripheral input. It may endure long after any injury has healed, may be entirely out of
proportion to the original (sometimes trivial) injury, or may arise in the absence of any
injury.
Many severe chronic pain disorders are “primary,” meaning the pain is itself the
disease; it does not derive from (is not “secondary to”) any other condition or injury.
Primary chronic pain conditions include some of the most common sources of work
absenteeism, doctor visits, and general misery: Chronic lower back pain and headache.
While some chronic back pain is traceable to mechanical issues like impinged nerves or
spinal abnormalities, most abnormal findings are merely incidental; correcting bulging
discs, for example, frequently does nothing to alleviate the pain.52 Similarly, most
headache conditions are not symptoms of “something else,” like a tumor or vascular
abnormality. The abnormality is in the central nervous system — a kind of “always on”
setting in the brain.
Other chronic pain syndromes may originate with a peripheral injury, but the
pain then “chronifies.” In pain chronification, the peripheral injury heals or appears to
heal completely but severe pain persists.53 Common forms of chronified post-injury
pain include post-surgical pain, complex regional pain syndrome, and phantom limb
pain.

If a patient is fortunate, his or her pain may be amenable to peripheral

intervention.54 But for the most part, interventions at the location where the person
experiences the pain make the pain worse, not better, because it is the brain itself that is
generating the false sensation of local pain.55

52

Such pain may be managed or, in some patients, resolved; however, manipulations or interventions in
the back itself often have no impact on the pain condition.

53

David Borsook et al., Neuroimaging Revolutionizes Therapeutic Approaches to Chronic Pain, 3
MOLECULAR PAIN art. no. 25, at 2 (2007).

54

A. Lee Dellon et al., Treatment of the Painful Neuroma by Neuroma Resection and Muscle
Implantation, 77 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 437 (1986).

55

See, e.g., Ronald Melzack et al., Central Neuroplasticity and Pathological Pain, 933 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 157, 162–63 (2001) (discussing denervation hypersensitivity; reporting that surgical nerve
resection can lead to increased pain due to neuronal activity in the somatosensory system). Cf. id. at 163–
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Some chronically painful conditions, like irritable bowel syndrome or advanced
arthritis, are associated with ongoing peripheral disease. But peripheral input causes
only part of patients’ pain:

Patients with these conditions develop neurologically

altered pain perception, leaving them with both peripheral disease and a central painprocessing disorder.56
Chronic pain, whether primary or secondary, both causes and results from a
phenomenon called “central sensitization,” in which the brain reorganizes its upward
and downward modulation of pain signals.57 Over time, over-activity in these neural
regions reshapes the brain, a process called “neuroplasticity.” Chronic pain sufferers
develop atrophy and hypertrophy in brain regions involved in pain signal transmission
and in the affective processing of pain.58 The longer a person suffers chronic pain, and
the more intense the pain, the greater the degree of volume loss (atrophy) is observed in
these brain regions.

This time-dependent, pain-dependent atrophy leads some

researchers to speculate that chronic pain is a neurodegenerative disease.59 Although
the mechanisms underlying pain-related neuroplasticity remain under investigation,
researchers agree that chronic pain changes the brain and does so progressively over
time.60
This model of chronic pain as a central nervous system disorder is quite new. In
Kuhnian fashion, it marks a paradigm shift away from the prior peripheral injury

67 (noting that improved surgical techniques, including administration of local anesthesia to nerves to be
resected, may improve such outcomes).
56

Sean C. Mackey & Fumiko Maeda, Functional Imaging and the Neural Systems of Chronic Pain, 15
NEUROSURGERY CLINICS N. AM. 269, 269–70 (2004) (identifying chronic low back pain, irritable bowel
syndrome, complex regional pain syndrome, and reflex sympathetic dystrophy as having significant
centralized involvement); see also Stephen E. Gwilym et al., Psychophysical and Functional Imaging
Evidence Supporting the Presence of Central Sensitization in a Cohort of Osteoarthritis Patients, 61
ARTHRITIS CARE & RESEARCH 1226 (2009).

57

Melzack et al., supra note 55, at (“Chronic pain involves changes in central pain processing mediated
through mechanisms of neural plasticity and leading to hyperexcitability of central structures.”).

58

Arne May, Chronic Pain May Change the Structure of the Brain, 137 PAIN 7, 8–9 (2008).

59

Borsook et al., supra note 53, at 2 (stating that chronic pain “must be considered as a chronic
degenerative disease … producing an altered brain state,” citing A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Back
Pain Is Associated with Decreased Pre-frontal and Thalamic Gray Matter Density, 24 J. NEUROSCI. 46
(2004) (hereinafter “Decreased Density”); A. Kuchinad et al., Accelerated Brain Gray Matter Loss in
Fibromyalgia Patients: Premature Aging of the Brain?, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 15 (2007)).

60

Melzack et al., supra note 55, at 167–69 (2001).
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model.61 It is puzzling that the peripheral injury model endured for so long, in light of
its general failure to explain the distress and match the symptomatology of many forms
of chronic pain. It may have been able to endure so long because studies of the central
nervous system were not developed enough to provide an alternative account for the
symptoms doctors encountered. It also may have endured in part because the theory of
psychogenic pain, and background norms relating to hysteria, allowed physicians to
explain away apparently anomalous cases.62 The peripheral injury model required — to
state the obvious — a causal peripheral injury. When physicians found no injury or no
relationship between a peripheral injury and the complained-of pain, they came to the
(apparently) ineluctable conclusion that the patient’s pain resulted from no physical
cause.63 This conclusion, in turn, was buttressed by the readily-available theories of
hysteria and conversion.64
The contemporary model that gives priority to brain-based processes may not be
the last word in pain science, and the field continues to evolve; but it has vastly more
explanatory and predictive power than the prior model. The sections below detail
particular neuroimaging technologies and what they currently show (and cannot show)
about chronic pain conditions.
B.

Structural Neuroimaging Shows Changes in Pain Sufferers’ Brains

1. Overview of Structural Neuroimaging
Magnetic resonance imaging generates a three-dimensional, highly detailed
representation of hard- and soft-tissue bodily structures. 65 MR images can show
whether there are structural abnormalities within the imaged area; many readers will
have direct experience of this through having had an MRI of the knee or lower back.
61

THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (4th ed. 2012).

62

See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.

63

Rollin M. Gallagher, Secondary Gain in Pain Medicine: Let Us Stick with Biobehavioral Data, 3 APS
J. 274, 274 (1994) (describing physician frustration with chronic pain claimants, and their tendency to fall
back on explanations of somatization and secondary gain, stating, “[t]he concept behind the use of the
term seemed simple: without a known biomedical cause, the symptom must be psychiatric.”)

64

See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.

65

Despite the verisimilitude of the MR image, unlike a photograph or an X-ray, an MR image is a
computer-generated composite constructed from data. DONALD W. MCROBBIE ET AL., MRI FROM
PICTURE TO PROTON (2007).
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MR images also show the volume of particular areas, allowing for the volume of the
same structure to be compared across subjects.
This volumetric comparison of different brain regions shown on an MRI is
performed using a mathematical technique known as “voxel-based morphometry,” or
VBM.

Just as a flat screen is comprised of pixels, locations within the three-

dimensional MR-image space are designated by volumetric pixels, called “voxels.”66
Standardizing a voxel map over brain images allows researchers to compare the
volumes of brain regions across subjects or within one subject over time.67
Studying the shape and size of brain regions — the brain’s “morphometry” —
using voxel-based comparisons enables a range of studies exploring the impact of
various conditions on brain size and structure.68 “Neuroplasticity” — the way the brain
remodels itself response to experience — has practically become a household word over
the last decade, in part because VBM can now show, noninvasively, how people’s brain
regions grow, shrink or reorganize.69
2. Brain-based Changes Reflect Duration, Severity, and Type of Pain
Three decades ago, Elaine Scarry famously wrote in The Body in Pain that
“physical pain” seems to have “no reality because it has not yet manifested itself on the
visible surface of the earth.”70 She described pain’s invisibility as causing it to be “that
which cannot be denied and [yet] that which cannot be confirmed.” 71 Structural
neuroimaging now shows that distinct chronic pain conditions produce characteristic
patterns of structural brain alteration, with the degree of visible brain alteration
correlating with the duration, severity, and kind of chronic pain. These findings lend
reality and specificity to chronic pain conditions:

Although the sensation of pain

remains invisible, pain creates visible traces in the body. Through these technologies,
66

Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 869 (2008).

67

The typical voxel in an MR brain image is about three millimeters on each side, or about nine cubic
millimeters. Logothetis, supra note 66.

68

Arne May, Magnetic Resonance-Based Morphometry: A Window into the Structural Plasticity of the
Brain, 19 CURRENT OPINION NEUROLOGY 407, 408–09 (2006).

69

Id.

70

ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 3–4 (1985).

71

Id. at 4.
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pain now is “visible on the surface of the earth”; it is now “that which cannot be denied
[and] that which cannot can now be confirmed.”72
The ground-breaking work that first showed the relationship between chronic
pain and regional brain atrophy was conducted by Vania Apkarian, a professor of
neuroscience at Northwestern University. In 2004, Apkarian showed that chronic back
pain is associated with decreased grey matter density in the prefrontal cortex and
thalamus of the brain.73 The core finding of this paper appeared to be: Chronic pain =
brain loss; more pain = more brain lost.74
Numerous prominent researchers have confirmed and extended these findings.
Professor Arne May, one of the world’s leading researchers on the structural
neuroimaging of headache pain, reports that VBM studies show significant changes in
grey matter in patients with chronic headache, chronic back pain, and phantom limb
pain.75 The more grey matter a subject has lost, the more sensitive he or she becomes to
pain.76 In a meta-review of the burgeoning research on structural pain imaging, May
reports that chronic pain most frequently leads to atrophy in the frontal lobes, followed
by atrophy in the cingulate cortex and the insula.77 Similarly, David Boorsook, a
Harvard-based pain researcher, has reported characteristic structural, functional and
molecular changes in brain regions in patients with chronic neuropathic pain, complex
regional pain disorder, and fibromyalgia.78 This ability to determine which parts of the
brain are compromised by specific chronic pain conditions “revolutionizes therapeutic

72

SCARRY, supra note 70, at 4 (alteration and emphasis added).

73

Apkarian et al., Decreased Density, supra note 59 at 46.

74

See, e.g., A. Vania Apkarian, Pain and the Brain: Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain in Clinical
Chronic Pain, 3 PAIN 162 (2011); David Borsook et al., Neuroimaging Revolutionizes Therapeutic
Approaches to Chronic Pain, 3 Molecular Pain 25, 27 (2007) (stating chronic pain “must be considered
as a chronic degenerative disease”).

75

Arne May, Neuroimaging: Visualizing the Brain in Pain, 28 NEUROLOGICAL SCI. S101 (2007).

76

Nichole M. Emerson et al., Pain Sensitivity Is Inversely Related to Regional Grey Matter Density in the
Brain, 155 PAIN 566 (2013).

77

Arne May Structural Brain Imaging: A Window into Chronic Pain, 17 NEUROSCIENTIST 209, 212
(2011); see also Arne May, New Insights into Headache: an Update on Functional and Structural
Imaging Findings, 5 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY 199–209 (2009) (reporting volumetric changes in the
insula, brain stem, and hypothalamus as characteristic of various primary headache syndromes).
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Borsook et al., supra note 74 at 29.
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approaches to chronic pain” by helping achieve diagnostic specificity and pointing
toward neurological targets for intervention.79
C.

Functional Neuroimaging in Chronic Pain

Distinct chronic pain conditions correlate with distinct structural brain changes,
as described above. Researchers are exploring whether particular types of chronic pain
correlate with specific functional patterns of activity in sufferers’ brains. The answer,
preliminarily, is yes: Functional neuroimaging shows that different pain conditions are
associated with characteristic patterns of brain activity. This section introduces how
functional brain imaging works, and then describes how functional imaging studies
contribute to understanding chronic pain disorders.
1. Overview of Functional Neuroimaging
The main technology for imaging the brain in pain is functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI).

This revolutionary technology allows researchers to

glimpse and approximate in real time the activity of the brain that corresponds to varied
kinds of action and experience. Using fMRI, researchers can start to understand which
regions of the brain are involved in perceiving and experiencing acute pain, and in
experiencing and generating chronic pain.
fMRI works by indirectly indicating where the brain is using more energy.80
The brain is constantly active, and certain regions of the brain preferentially become
active when a person engages in a particular task or thought process.81 Usually, many
regions become active together, because the brain is a highly interconnected system.82
When brain regions become more active, their metabolic demands go up: They need
more oxygen and glucose, which are delivered by increased blood flow.
79

Id.

80

See, e.g., Nikos K. Logothetis, The Underpinnings of the BOLD Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Signal, 23 J. NEUROSCI. 3963, 3963 (2003).

81

Id.

82

John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You're Imaging the Brain Doesn't Mean You Can Stop Using
Your Head: A Primer and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 650, 651 (2003);
see also, e.g., Matthew Brett et al., The Problem of Functional Localization in the Human Brain, 3
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 243, 243 (2002) (detailing problems with using fMRI to localize complex
and interconnected brain functions).
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When an MRI machine sends magnetic pulses through the subject’s brain, it can
detect these changes in blood flow.83 The magnetic pulses are not distorted by oxygenrich blood, but deoxygenated blood distorts the magnetic wave slightly.84 This creates
the “Blood Oxygen Level-Dependent,” or BOLD, signal.85 Researchers generate a
composite picture of which regions in the brain show increased or decreased blood flow
during a task or experience. 86 It is important to understand that fMRI is not a
photograph of brain activity. Instead, it is like looking at a map of where a city uses
energy, which can indicate where the city is bustling and where it is sleepy.
In investigating acute pain and chronic pain conditions, fMRI has proven
revelatory. Irene Tracey, an Oxford University-based scientist, was the first to use
fMRI to image the brain in pain. She has shown not only which regions of the brain
process acute pain, but also that subjective self-reports of acute pain correlate with the
degree of activity in the subjects’ brains.87 That is, the phenomenology of pain matches
the physiological degree of response to pain, a fascinating empirical contribution to
philosophical debates on perception. Researchers have used fMRI to show functional
brain reorganization in patients with chronic pain,88 and have even shown that particular
types of functional reorganization are characteristic of distinct chronic pain
conditions.89
fMRI has important limitations, however. First, it has temporal limitations:
Blood flow may precede neural activity — or it may lag behind.90 Spatially, the signal
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John A. Detre, Clinical Applicability of Functional MRI, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 808,
808 (2006).

84

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 809.
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Irene Tracey & Patrick Mantyh, The Cerebral Signature for Pain Perception and its Modulation, 55
NEURON 377 (2007).

88

May, supra note 75, at S104–S105 (showing functional reorganization in headache syndromes and that
degree of reorganization correlates with degree of pain and impairment).

89

May, Structural, supra note 77, at 211 (review article reporting functional imaging findings of
headache syndromes; showing distinct brain regions become active during pain attacks in the various
syndromes).

90

Nikos K. Logothetis & Josef Pfeuffer, On the Nature of the BOLD fMRI Contrast Mechanism, 22
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 1517, 1524 (2004).
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from blood vessels may not be precisely where the neural activity is taking place.91
Third, there is a great deal of normal variation in brain response in a single subject
(person) across different trials, and lots of variation between subjects.92 An fMRI
showing the response to a particular stimulus like pain is an average — an average of
many trials of one subject, and an average of many trials across different subjects. The
composite fMRI showing what “the brain” does in response to, say, a painful heat
stimulus may not look exactly like any single scan of any subject’s brain in that
experiment.93
2. fMRI as Objective Measure of Pain?
When fMRI studies have created a robust composite of average brain activity in
response to a particular stimulus (say, acute pain), then researchers can use software to
compare an individual brain scan to the composite and make an educated guess about
whether the individual is experiencing the same thing. 94

Could fMRI pattern

classification provide a “pain-o-meter” to help legal actors improve trial outcomes and
better manage systems at risk for fraud?
A team of researchers led by Sean Mackey at Stanford University have
developed an fMRI protocol that can determine in most cases whether a subject in an
fMRI scanner is experiencing acute pain.95 In a paper tantalizingly entitled, Towards a
Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns of Human Brain Activity Distinguish
Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, the authors assert that their findings
demonstrate that fMRI “can assess pain without requiring any communication from the
person being tested.”96 This work has been refined and extended by Tor Wager, whose
recent work in the New England Journal of Medicine showed that fMRI could detect
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Id.
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Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 275 (2007).
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Id.
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Justin E. Brown, Neil Chatterjee, Jarred Younger, & Sean Mackey, Toward a Physiology-Based
Measure of Pain: Patterns of Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal
Stimulation, 6 PLOS ONE e24124, *2 (Sept. 2011) (describing machine learning paradigm).

95

Id. at *7.

96

Id. at *1.
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acute pain in normal, healthy subjects with ninety-five percent accuracy.97
This major research accomplishment looks like a pain-o-meter, but it is not.98
Even if this protocol worked perfectly in predicting acute pain (and it currently has a
relatively high rate of error), it would be of limited use relative to chronic pain, as these
conditions present very differently neurologically. Further, acute pain can be produced
in the lab; chronic pain may or may not be present, and may be present at varying
intensities, at the time of a test. Apart from pain detection, though, fMRI can detect
changes in the “default-mode network,” or patterns of background activity, of chronic
pain sufferers’ brains.99 This finding helps explain perceptual, cognitive, and affective
impairments that occur in these conditions.100 Perhaps in the future, fMRI of the default
network may have diagnostic potential, helping categorize patients, plaintiffs or
claimants.
III.

NEUROIMAGING SHOULD CHANGE NORMS AND DOCTRINE IN DISABILITY LAW
The new science of chronic pain, particularly neuroimaging of chronic pain,

should lead to modifications to the Social Security Disability regulations and, in the
near term, to judicial reinterpretation of the existing regulations. This Part first presents
the SSDI regulations and the 1984 Amendment to those regulations, which were
intended to provide adjudicators with greater guidance on how to evaluate claims
grounded in chronic pain.
While regulatory reform may proceed slowly, federal judicial interpretation of
the existing regulations could evolve without delay to incorporate new scientific
knowledge.

After exploring the regulations, this Section turns to how judges in

different circuits interpret and apply the SSDI regulations. Judicial interpretations vary
considerably from circuit to circuit, incorporating a range of understandings of chronic
pain, some of which are loose and unbounded, while others are unrealistically narrow
97

Tor Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
1388, 1388 (2013).
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Brown, supra note 94, at *5 (“We are still very far from a physiology-based pain assessment tool that
could be used in clinical, forensic, and other applied settings.”).
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Marwan N. Baliki et al., Beyond Feeling: Chronic Pain Hurts the Brain, Disrupting the Default-Mode
Network Dynamics, 28 J. NEUROSCI. 1398 (2008) (using fMRI to show default-mode network changes in
chronic pain sufferers).

100

Id.
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and restrictive. The variability not only fails to comport with pain science but violates
horizontal equity, as similarly-situated claimants may received different outcomes
depending only on the circuit in which their cases proceed. And, it imposes costs on the
system: Circuits that use an under-defined standard may increase the likelihood of fraud
and abuse, while those that use a harsh and unrealistic standard may frustrate the
purposes of the Act. This Part proposes ways in which judicial interpretation of the
existing regulations ought to change to incorporate new scientific knowledge about
chronic pain.
A.

Social Security Disability Doctrine and Practice Relating to Chronic Pain

Disability, under the Social Security Disability Insurance program (SSDI), often
turns crucially on pain — whether the claimant is in pain, and whether that pain is
intense, constant, and traceable to an objectively identifiable medical condition.
Although only about one in five Social Security claimants receives benefits pursuant to
the Disability program, determining whether claimants in fact are disabled “now
constitutes the major part of the Social Security Administration workload . . . .”101 SSA
receives about six hundred thousand hearing requests annually, a large percentage of
which involve claims of chronic pain.102
Yet, the disability law regime has struggled with the problem of pain since its
inception. Despite its prominence as a cause of disability, “chronic pain” is not defined
within the Social Security Administration’s regulations. As a result of the Act’s silence
on pain, early cases litigated under the Act held as a matter of law that pain could not be
disabling. This principle changed in 1961, when the Fifth Circuit held in Butler v.
Flemming that chronic pain could constitute a disability under the Act.103 The Butler
principle spread rapidly; eventually, every circuit recognized that pain could render a

101

Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 FED. REG. 16,424,
16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and
Social Security’s Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 191 (2007)
(Symposium: Social Security in Transition) (describing the toll on administrative resources of
adjudicating disability claims).
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Bloch, supra note 101, at 192 (providing figures).
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288 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1961).
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person disabled within the meaning of the Act. 104 Such pain must arise from a
“medically determinable physical or mental impairment.”105
This double-edged recognition of pain as disabling, but only when it arises from
a distinct or determinable impairment, endures today. Chronic pain cannot serve as a
valid category of disability unless the pain is caused by some condition separate from
the pain itself, such rheumatoid or osteoarthritis giving rise to pain, or back injury
giving rise to pain, and so forth. Claimants who cannot point to a known medical
condition capable of giving rise to pain cannot be found disabled based on pain — with
one exception. That exception is psychogenic or somatized pain.
Since the disability regime’s inception, the drafters of the disability regulations
and the judges who interpret them have recognized that disabling pain does frequently
occur independently of a disabling injury or obvious disease. To provide compensation
to claimants who appeared to demonstrate genuine suffering but who could not show
evidence of a distinct injury or disease, ALJs and federal judges arrived at the workaround of finding such claimants psychiatrically disabled. Claimants with chronic pain
thus could qualify as disabled if they could receive a diagnosis and a finding of a
psychiatric pain condition, generally either psychogenic pain, “somatoform pain
disorder,” or “conversion disorder.” This allows for financial recovery in some cases.
However, it also reinforces the notion that chronic pain is hysterically generated — and
it affords no recovery to people suffering from chronic pain who do not also
demonstrate the symptoms necessary for a suitable psychiatric disorder. The rest of this
section explores in detail these issues under the regulations.
1. Legal Framework: Statutory and Regulatory Regime
Under the Social Security Disability Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 423, disability
insurance (DI) is available to any person with a “disability” who is an “insured” under
the Act and who is under the age of 65. Similarly, under the Social Security Insurance
program (SSI) established in the same Act, benefits are available to people who are both
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indigent and disabled. The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment . . . .”106 The impairment, further, must “be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”107
Within the meaning of the Social Security Act, a condition (like pain) can be
“disabling” if it results from “a medical impairment” that could “reasonably be expected”
to cause the kind and degree of impairment alleged.108 Medical proof is built into the
statutory regime: the claimant must provide “objective medical evidence”109 showing a
“medically determinable” impairment,110 and the associated disability must “result[]
from anatomical [or] physiological … abnormalities” that are “demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”111 The Act is
implemented through Federal Regulations 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b) and 404.1529(b),
which require a claimant to provide objective evidence of a “condition which could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.”
Neither the Act nor its implementing regulations define disabling pain nor list
disabling pain conditions.112 In the absence of guidance in the Act or its regulations
about what chronic pain is, administrative and Article III courts have struggled over
time to determine how to adjudicate an increasing caseload of pain-based claims.
Courts have found particularly challenging the subjective and variable nature of chronic
pain, as well as claimants’ assertions that they suffer chronic pain in the absence of an
obvious, ongoing injury.113
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2. The Problematic 1984 Regulations: Pain as Symptom of “Something Else”
As a result of ongoing judicial confusion and inconsistency, congress revisited
the question of DI/SSI pain evaluation guidelines in the early 1980s.114 In 1984,
congress issued new guidelines amending the Act that ostensibly instructed courts how
to proceed in evaluating chronic pain claims. The 1984 Amendment lays out a threepart inquiry, codified and elaborated in SSA regulations. Under the Amendment and
the regulations derived from it, the claimant first must show by “by medically
acceptable . . . diagnostic techniques” that he or she suffers a “medical impairment that
results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities . . . .”115 This
showing of medical causation is “a threshold requirement; a sine qua non” of any valid
claim. 116

Second, the fact-finder must determine that the abnormalities could

“reasonably be expected to produce the pain” to the degree complained of.117 If the
pain is more severe or longer lasting than would be typical for the underlying
impairment, then the ALJ is instructed to examine other evidence bearing on the degree
of the claimant’s pain and his or her resulting impairment. Third and finally, the
medically-demonstrable pain must reasonably “lead to a conclusion that the individual
is under a disability,” 118 meaning that the pain must preclude the claimant from
engaging in “any substantial gainful activity.”119
The Amendment and related regulations attempt to define when pain is legally
disabling. Yet, when read narrowly, these provisions do not define pain as a legally
disabling condition at all. Rather, the SSA recognizes as disabling any underlying
medical impairments that reasonably and actually cause severe chronic pain, not chronic
pain itself. The first step of the inquiry is of a threshold showing of some “anatomical,
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physiological or psychological abnormalit[y],” and the second step is the determination
of whether such abnormality could be “reasonably expected to produce the pain.”120
Pain thus is conceived of as the product, the output of the disease state or abnormal
condition. Thus, under the Act, pain cannot itself be the basis of a claim of disability.
This distinction between pain as a symptom versus pain as a disease in itself
might seem recondite. But it has enormous importance: The Act perpetuates the
conception of pain-as-symptom, pain as derivative. Instead, as discussed in Part II,
chronic pain often is a disease in itself. Chronic pain without lesion may be associated
with abnormal biomarkers and brain states, yet currently there is no known cause for
many chronic pain conditions or for why apparently healed peripheral injury can
continue to be associated with pain. This matters legally because it means that chronic
pain often is not, as required by the Act, demonstrably the product of another
impairment or condition.
If under the guidelines the pain must be “produced by” another condition, then
adjudicators face the problem of seemingly uncaused chronic pain, where the suffering
is obvious but its sources are not. Many judges have tried to interpret the requirement
that pain arise from another condition generously, so that it comports with their general
intuition that chronic pain can be real in the absence of an evident injury or with their
particular assessment of a claimant as sincere in his or her suffering. What judges have
fallen back upon in the absence of a convincing mechanism to explain chronic pain has
been the notion that chronic pain is a real disorder, but of psychiatric origin.
Following the 1984 amendments, many judges started to do what some handful
of them had done before: find that claimants are disabled by “psychogenic pain” or by
the closely related psychiatric diagnosis of “somatoform pain disorder” (SPD), the
modern heir to the old diagnosis of hysteria. Psychogenic pain and SPD have been the
savior and the nemesis of chronic pain claimants: Savior, because these diagnoses
provides legal and medical recognition and financial compensation for unexplained
pain; nemesis, because shoe-horning chronic pain into these psychiatric diagnoses
carries several negative consequences. First, the claimant has to meet the burden of
producing convincing evidence of psychogenic pain or SPD, which he may not be able
120
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to offer if his condition is not psychiatric in origin. Second, a claimant’s categorization
as suffering from psychiatric pain may limit his or her access to medical interventions
that would be contraindicated for psychiatric pain. Treatment flows from diagnosis: If
the diagnosis is that a person’s chronic pain arises from repressed emotion, then an
insurer might reimburse comparatively inexpensive psychiatric medication but might
deny coverage for interventional procedures like nerve blocks. Finally, if the claimant
is successful, he or she then labors not only under the disability of pain but also the
stigma of a psychiatric diagnosis.
B.

Improving SSDI Regulations with New Pain Science

Although a claimant need not provide courts with “objective evidence of pain,”
she must (reasonably enough) provide “objective evidence of a medical condition that
could cause the pain alleged.”121 Yet, if current descriptions of pain chronification
mechanisms are accurate, then much chronic pain will occur in the absence of any
separate or distinct “condition” that “produce[s] the pain,” other than the chronic pain
condition itself.122 At least as currently discernible by medical science, there may be no
no obvious anatomical abnormality, no peripheral smoking gun.
It sounds circular to say that pain is the symptom of the disease of pain, which
reasonably can be expected to produce pain! But the appearance of circularity is merely
semantic. It disappears if the relationship between the experience of pain and the
condition giving rise to it is reconceptualized like this: Chronic pain may be produced
and maintained by neurological alterations, which modify the brain’s functional patterns
and structure.

This type of central nervous system sensitization may arise in

conjunction with a peripheral injury or disease, it may endure after a peripheral injury
heals, or it may arise in the absence of any peripheral cause, as with primary headache
syndromes.123
To bring the regulations in line with the current state of medical knowledge
about pain chronification, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b) and 404.1529(b) should be amended
to recognize that chronic pain can persist after an initial trauma, injury, or disease has
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actually or apparently resolved. There are several ways that this amendment could be
implemented. I suggest that the language of the regulations be amended to read,
“objective evidence of a medical condition, including chronic pain conditions, that
could cause the pain alleged.” This language would incorporate into the regulations the
reality that chronic pain is a medical condition — a neurological disorder of diverse
etiology but fairly uniform mechanism, characterized by abnormal activation of areas of
the brain related to pain perception and generally independent of any peripheral input.
Alternatively, the language of the regulations could remain as they are, but an
advisory committee or other body within the Social Security Administration could
promulgate an interpretive memorandum that defines chronic pain as an independent
medical condition that satisfies the definition set forth in the regulations.

This

memorandum should communicate the contemporary medical-scientific model of
chronic pain as involving both peripheral and central nervous system alterations in pain
transmission and perception. It should emphasized that such central nervous system
sensitization may arise in conjunction with a peripheral injury or disease or in the
absence of a peripheral cause. This is consistent with the requirement that claims be
supported by objective medical evidence, as numerous diagnostic tests and criteria exist
for the medical diagnosis chronic pain conditions.
C.

Revising Judge-Made Disability Standards in Light of New Pain Science

To account for contemporary pain science, the ways judges adjudicate disability
cases at the administrative and federal level similarly must evolve, in concert with
amendments to the regulations or independently. The regulations functionally may be
changed through new judicial interpretations: Courts have the authority to recognize
medical evidence that chronic pain can be an independent and distinct medical
condition under the regulations as they currently exist. In this way, courts could simply
incorporate evidence of pain chronification as a distinct neurological disorder into the
existing disability framework that requires objective evidence of a medical condition
that reasonably could lead to the degree of pain alleged.
This avenue of constructive judicial amendment of the regulations is attractive
because it does not require time-consuming administrative or legislative action.
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However, it ought to be a second-line alternative to revision of the regulations: It relies
on diffuse bodies, ALJs and Article III judges, independently becoming aware of
contemporary pain science and then crafting appropriate interpretive and evidentiary
standards. Given the range of cases that judges must handle on a daily basis, it is not
realistic to expect that more than a few of them will come to the scientific literature on
their own and develop new standards. Moreover, district court judges, who are the
more likely sources of innovation, are constrained by the standards already established
by the appellate courts of their circuits. However, until SSA does act on this — and
recall that SSA has been stalled since 1984 — individual judges may use their
courtrooms as “laboratories of innovation.”124
This short section first describes the different and conflicting judge-made
standards that circuits employ to interpret the SSDI regulations.

These varying

standards reflect a continuum from leniency to harshness, yet none reflects
contemporary pain science. These varying standards also lead to radically different
outcomes for similarly-situated claimants. After exploring the case law, this section
suggests how courts could use pain science to revise their circuits’ interpretations of
these regulations.
1. Judge-Made Disability Law and its Vagaries
Even though ALJs and federal courts continue to engage faithfully in the
Regulations’ prescribed inquiries, they reach wildly divergent conclusions and have
established inconsistent standards across federal circuits.

Courts do share a basic

consensus that pain must be severe to qualify as disabling; also, they agree that a person
is not disabled merely because he or she cannot work pain-free. Beyond that foundation,
courts across the United States apply three quite distinct pain evaluation standards.
Although the courts that articulate these standards all cite the SSA regulation, nothing in
that Regulation sets forth any one the elements of these requirements, much less all of
them. These inconsistent and often vague standards leave adjudicators in the position of
needing to fall back on their personal judgment about what pain looks like and whose
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pain they believe to be real.
The most permissive standard provides that, to be disabled by pain, a claimant
may be capable of gainful employment but that engaging in such employment would
cause the claimant “great pain.”125 This is a minority standard, perhaps because it is in
some tension with the SSD regulation providing that a claimant must be incapable of
performing “any substantial gainful activity.”126
Courts in a majority of jurisdictions apply an intermediate standard.

This

standard provides that a person’s pain must be so severe as to preclude gainful
employment entirely, rendering work impossible.127 Under this standard, a person who
would experience “great pain” from his or her work duties, but who was not entirely
“preclude[d]” from performing them, would not qualify as disabled.
The most draconian pain standard is that developed by the Fifth Circuit.
According to the case law of that circuit, to qualify as disabling, pain must not only
preclude the claimant from any significant gainful employment; it also “must be
constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment.” 128 This
standard is not grounded in the language or substance of any disability statutes or
regulations and is flatly contrary to the biology of chronic pain diseases. Chronic pain
conditions remit and relapse. Many people with life-long chronic pain conditions may
have pain-free days. A person also may have pain every day, but the level of pain will
vary from day to day, and often from morning to night.129 Indeed, a claim that one’s
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pain is absolutely invariable is more likely to be a marker of an inartfully fabricated
claim than of an actual chronic pain condition.

Moreover, fortunately, almost all

chronic pain conditions can be at least partially treated, whether interventionally,
pharmacologically, or behaviorally. Thus this standard’s requirement that the condition
be “wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” is as misguided as its insistence that
the pain be constant in its level.
It is ironic that a judicial interpretation of the disability regulations perhaps
inspired by judges’ desire to reduce fraudulent claims instead would articulate criteria
more likely to reward the fraudster than the legitimate claimant, while enshrining the
notion that claimants who do not meet this fictitious characterization of pain are frauds!
This problem-fraught standard might be of limited interest beyond the Fifth Circuit,
except that it is spreading to federal courts in the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eight Circuits, as well as to some ALJs. Because of its legal significance and the
instructive depth of its manifold error, it is worth analyzing this standard and its history
closely.
The story of this standard dates back forty years to an opinion issued by an ALJ
against claimant Chaney, holding he was not disabled because he did not have any
“significant signs” consistent with chronic pain.130 Cheney appealed and, in Chaney v.
Califano, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 131 In considering the ALJ’s finding that the
claimant was not disabled, the court quoted the ALJ’s statement that:
[P]ain is a subjective symptom that is not measurable, and it is
recognized that there are many disorders in which . . . pain is
constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic
measures. Generally, when an individual has suffered severe pain
for a long time, there are observable signs . . . . In the instant case,
there are no such significant signs or circumstances.132
Highlighting this language from the ALJ’s opinion, the court in Chaney did not
hold against the claimant because his pain was not “constant, unremitting, and wholly
PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOL. 81 (2009) (describing neurological bases of pain variation in chronic pain
conditions).
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unresponsive to treatment.”133 Nor did it state that only pain rising to that level
constitutes statutory disability. Rather, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling
against Chaney because he showed “no … significant signs” of suffering “severe pain
for a long time.”134 The disability standard the AJL actually employed, and that
adopted by the circuit, was simply “severe pain for a long time,” not pain “constant,
unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to treatment.” Effectively, the court held quite
reasonably and unremarkably that a disability claim must be supported by evidence of
the disability.
Yet several years later, in Hames v. Heckler, a different panel of the Circuit
seized on that dicta from Cheney to hold that “[p]ain, in and of itself has been
recognized as a disabling condition under the Act, but only where it is constant,
unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment.” 135 Heckler thus
established in the Fifth Circuit a pain evaluation standard that is: (1) not present in the
Act or any of the SSA’s regulations; (2) based on an apparent misreading of the
Circuit’s own prior case law; and (3) wholly inconsistent with the biology of chronic
pain.136
More than one third of other circuit courts now employ the Fifth Circuit’s
standard in some cases. Although none of these circuits has adopted the standard across
the board, each employs it selectively. Courts’ selective use of this harsh and restrictive
standard in some cases, but not in others, could result from any variety of factors from
judges’ beliefs about the appropriate scope of social programs to variable research
quality among law clerks. It may also reflect judges’ personal responses to a claimant
or type of pain syndrome, or a general skepticism toward pain claimants.
2. Normative Dimensions of Judge-Made Standards
The Seventh Circuit case Carradine v. Barnhart is just one case of many that
illuminates the normative, rather than doctrinal or medical, values that play into
mobilizing the “constant, unremitting, and totally unresponsive to therapeutic treatment”
133
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standard.137 In Carradine, a panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the finding of the
ALJ that the claimant was not disabled due to chronic back pain.138 The plaintiff had
endured several spinal surgeries, had a morphine pump implanted in her spine, and had
severely curtailed her daily activities, but reported that she occasionally could take short
walks or do some shopping.139 She did not have a history of mental illness.140 However,
she lacked evidence of spinal abnormality or other visible causes of the alleged severe
chronic pain.141
Working within the constraints imposed by the regulations that a claimant
cannot be disabled due to chronic pain without providing evidence of an objective
medical condition that could produce the pain, Judge Posner penned a majority opinion
finding Carradine disabled due to psychogenic pain, “somatoform pain disorder.”142
Carradine’s case presented no evidence of psychiatric disability independent of her
persistent back pain. 143 Yet, because Carradine did not have evidence of gross
abnormalities or a disease independent of back pain itself, the court was constrained by
the regulations either to find that she was not disabled or that Carradine’s disability
originated in a psychiatric disorder. Crediting the record that Carradine had endured
risky and painful surgeries to find relief from her pain, and that she increasingly
withdrew from pleasurable life activities, the majority was unwilling to find that she
was not both experiencing pain and disabled by it. Accordingly, it crafted a remedy
through relying on the psychiatric diagnosis available under the regulations.
The majority holding engendered a blistering dissent, written almost entirely in
italics, with bold for emphasis, mobilizing the “constant, unremitting, and wholly
unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.144 What makes the dissent remarkable
beyond its typography is that it baldly asserts that chronic pain in the absence of evident
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peripheral injury simply does not exist — and that any claim to the contrary is pure
fakery. The dissent berates the majority for failing to apply the “constant, unremitting,
and totally unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.145 It notes that Carradine
admitted that, on good days, she could take a short walk with her daughter; this, the
dissent emphasizes, shows that the pain is not “constant and unremitting” and, therefore,
not disabling. It goes on to assert that any pain without a clear peripheral cause, like
Mrs. Carradine’s back pain, is either imagined or faked.146
While the majority employs the psychiatric route as a way to compensate a
claimant, the dissent argues the reverse: that people with psychogenic pain should not
be rewarded.147 Such rewards, the dissent argues, just encourages what is, in effect, bad
behavior — like giving a child an ice cream for a temper tantrum. In this manner, the
dissent reinforces the stereotype that chronic pain patients are self-indulgent malingers
or hysterics and that the only remedy they deserve is the sharp admonition to snap out
of it.
The Carradine dissent is exemplary in tipping its normative hand: An
adjudicator in the Fifth Circuit would be constrained to apply this standard, which is
part of that jurisdiction’s precedent. Yet, in jurisdictions like the Seventh Circuit, where
this standard is uncommon, an adjudicator must make an affirmative choice to adopt it
as an expression of a negative perception of pain-based disability. Further, although the
Carradine dissent stands out stands in its vitriol toward the claimant and chronic pain
claimants generally, it is not substantively an aberration. Certain judges across the
country selectively apply the “constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive”
standard, and two lower courts had held consistently with this appellate dissent.
Ironically, the majority’s need to rely on the psychiatric diagnosis to support its
disability finding feeds into the very stereotypes that animate the dissent. The majority,
however, took this route because it was constrained by the regulations to find a
psychiatric cause of disability. This means that the regulations themselves, in their
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attempt to provide a compensable category of disability for chronic pain without lesion
through the somatoform diagnosis, undermine their purpose by misdescribing many
chronic pain syndromes and by marginalizing chronic pain sufferers as mentally ill.
Perhaps with greater medical knowledge and objective proof of the mechanisms that
cause chronic pain, prevalent norms of skepticism and hostility toward chronic pain
claimants can be supplanted.
IV.

NEUROIMAGING SHOULD CHANGE “SOFT” AND “HARD” EVIDENTIARY PRACTICES
This Part explores neuroimaging evidence in light of the “hard” and “soft”

practices of evidence law — that is, relative to the text of the rules as well as in light of
the arguably more important norms and expectations that decision-makers use to give
content and meaning to those rules. These norms and expectations shape not only
judges’ evidentiary calls but also their statutory interpretation practices and, thus, the
creation of doctrine. This section will argue that neuroimaging currently ought to have
some impact on both hard and soft practices, but far more on the latter.
Evidence practice at trial consists of more than the application of the rules; it
embraces the narrative character of the trial and extends to the evaluative process of
judges and juries. These “soft” practices shape the trial process from the earliest stages
of case building through to the appellate process, as decision-makers at each stage
evaluate evidentiary relevance, weight, and prejudice in light of their cultural and
narrative expectations. Partly rooted in fear of fraud, partly in Freudian misconceptions
of “hysteria,” soft practices of evidence relating to pain claimants may reflect
entrenched biases.

Judges and juries’ norms and expectations about chronic pain

claimants and about the type of evidence required to make the claims credible should
and likely will change in light of the new neuroscientific model of chronic pain.
At the same time, neuroimaging evidence may find its way into the “hard”
practices of evidence. In some cases, it likely will be appropriate to admit some
neuroimaging studies of chronic pain into evidence under the federal and state evidence
rules. Aggregate data about the average impact of pain conditions can inform doctrines
relating to pain claims and expectations about the likely presentation and lifecourse of a
typical pain sufferer. Currently, however, neuroimaging should not be introduced to
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support or attack an individual’s claim relating to chronic pain.148 This is because of
certain limitations of neuroimaging technologies and the medical variability of chronic
pain conditions. This is not to say never, however: Science and technology in this area
are developing quickly and, in ten years’ time, another view may be the right one.
This Part will look first at how “soft” evidentiary practices may be shifted by
pain neuroimaging. It explores several evidentiary theories to explain how existing
background expectations — whether called narratives, scripts, or another of the myriad
terms scholars use for like phenomena — about chronic pain distort the legal process. It
then offers specific suggestions for how new scientific models can change social and
legal constructions in this arena, thus affecting evidence admissibility and weight, and,
ultimately, the outcomes of cases.

It then turns to “hard” evidence practices,

considering how pain neuroimaging evidence should be evaluated under federal, state,
and administrative evidence regimes. It concludes that pain neuroimaging and related
research ought to be admissible in appropriate cases at the aggregate level but not to
prove pain in any individual case.
A.

“Soft” Evidentiary Practices Shape the Litigation Process

1. Narrative, Norms & the Meaning of Proof: the Soft Side of Evidence Law
The kind and degree of proof that satisfies a reasonable person relates to his or
her understanding of the nature of the problem under consideration. Claims about
expected or common events seem relatively plausible; these might be called
“confirming” claims because they agree with the average decision-maker’s lived
experience and expectations. Claims about rare or unexpected events, conversely,
invite relative skepticism; these might be called “confounding” claims because they
confound the average decision-maker’s experience, expectations, or beliefs.
Confirming claims require less, and less specialized, evidence than confounding claims,
which may require extraordinary proof or even strike the relevant decision-maker as
unprovable.
Chronic pain presents confounding claims because most decision-makers have
little direct experience of such conditions; further, they are likely to hold common but
148
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mistaken beliefs about chronic pain’s causes, presentation, and persistence. Indeed,
there is active disinformation about chronic pain: A dominant cultural narrative depicts
chronic pain conditions as expressions of neurosis or hysteria, and legal doctrines, like
those in disability law, directly incorporate this narrative into law.
Whether a claim is confirming or confounding — whether it accords with
background norms and expectations — has implications for the entire legal process and
for evidence law in particular. Evidence scholarship must attend not only to the ways in
which background expectations generally influence the fact-finding process but to
instances where specific, erroneous expectations distort the legal process.

These

distortions can affect evidence admissibility determinations, the degree of weight that
decision-makers give to admitted evidence, the ways in which decision-makers evaluate
evidence against the relevant legal standard, and the conclusions that they reach in the
matter.149
The role of cultural expectations and scripts, or “narratives,” is central to
numerous theories of evidence law and, indeed, to theories of the construction of law
itself. Preeminent legal scholars of the latter part of the Twentieth Century, like Robert
Cover, put narrative at the center of the legal academy’s agenda with articles like
Nomos and Narrative, in which he argued that legal actors create a shared normative
world — a nomos — through operative narratives, and that all legal production and
interpretation takes place within the nomos.150 Narrative studies within law advanced
the project of excavating contestable narratives and then of crafting counter-narratives
and counter-histories to challenge them.151 More contemporary theories of judicial and
juror decision-making have moved away from the literary emphasis of narrative theory,
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drawing instead on fields ranging from logical philosophy to behavioral economics.152
These contemporary theories and older narrative-based theories share a central insight:
Decision-makers impose order on the teeming facts of the world by screening in
evidence that is confirming and screening out evidence that is confounding, consistently
preferring the interpretation that conforms to their expectations.
2. Confounding Claims and the Quantum of Proof Needed to “Prove”
Degrees of doubt often inversely shadow degrees of understanding and
acceptance. Thresholds of proof track cultural narratives and evolve as those narratives
evolve. Up through the mid-20th Century, when it was commonly believed that women
lied about consensual sex to protect their reputations for chastity or fabricated a rape
claim entirely, more evidence of rape was necessary to render credible a complainant’s
allegation. 153

Statutes requiring independent corroboration of the rape victim’s

complaint, which have their roots in biblical law, were in force in jurisdictions in the
United States through the 1970s.154 Other formal sources of evidence practice like
pattern jury instructions also embodied the doubt and skepticism facing rape
complainants.

Even into the 1980s, pattern jury instructions stated that failure to

promptly report a claim of rape supported an inference of fabrication.155 Another jury
instruction, derived from Lord Hale, cautioned jurors that a rape accusation “is one
which is easily made .… [T]he law requires that you examine the testimony of the
[alleged victim] with caution.”156
Evidence law and practice in this area emerged from and reinforced norms of
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suspicion about women’s veracity, especially as to matters of sex. 157

They

incorporated, too, a concern about fraud: Fraudulent claims are easy to make and hard
to disprove. In these areas, subsequent dialogue between research data and normative
change has altered the landscape of proof — not so much through changes in law itself
as through changes in the default expectations of the participants in the system.158
Chronic pain is not equivalent to crimes of sexual assault, and chronic pain
claimants are not viewed in a manner directly equivalent to rape victims. But the
former is an illustrative parallel to the latter for several reasons. Chronic pain affects
both men and women but affects women significantly disproportionately; background
concerns about the unreliable female narrator thus affect pain claimants, too.159 Chronic
pain claims, like claims of sexual victimization, have long invited doubt and even
presumptions of fabrication. And the hysterical or secondary gain theories of chronic
pain share an origin with some of the psychoanalytic theories suggesting that women
fantasize sexual violence, specifically because they enjoy the status of victimhood or
the subjective feeling of victimization itself.160 Further, and perhaps most importantly,
the history of change in evidence law related to rape shows how evidence incorporates
and reinforces background expectations or schemas about particular kinds of claimants.
Reliance on narratives and background expectations may “conflict … with the
truth-seeking goals of trial” and “risk distortions in fact-finding.”161 Several scholars
have pointed to these risks and flaws in decision-making as opportunities to “to increase
analytic processing” by nudging trials away from the narrative model.162 It is likely that
157
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aspects of narrative are inescapable in the legal process; indeed, narrative may be
essential to all legal endeavors, given that the structures and forms of the legal systems
have emerged from human cognition. The purpose here would not be to remove
narrative itself, but to change the narrative expectations and content.
Contemporary models offer a range of alternative accounts of how judges and
jurors weigh diverse facts to reach a verdict or judgment. Like the narrative model,
these models also rely heavily on decision-makers’ background assumptions about the
world — that is, their norms and expectations. Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen have
advanced a decision-making model that they call the “explanation-based model.”163 In
their account, jurors engage in a technique of “inference to the best explanation”
(known formally in logical philosophy as “abductive reasoning”) to arrive at a
conclusion that reconciles the facts of the case in a way that is “simple” and
“coherent.”164 By “coherent,” Pardo and Allen mean a story that “better accords with
background beliefs . . . .”165 As in the narrative model, the abductive or explanationbased model describes and predicts that decision-makers discount or outright reject
facts that do not comport with their background beliefs. Thus, background beliefs do a
large share of the work in both explaining how decision-makers weigh evidence and in
constituting what counts as legal proof.
Evidence scholarship that draws on behavioral economics also supports the role
of background expectations or culturally received stories. Several of the key heuristics
and biases identified by behavioral economics support the conclusion decision-makers
prefer confirming stories and resist confounding stories. Following the influential work
of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, prominent scholars like Dan Simon have
explored the implications of a “two system” method of decision-making. The “two
system” hypothesis posits that people engage functionally (albeit not neurologically)
distinct cognitive systems for making different kinds of decisions. People mobilize
System 1 for rapid, intuitive decision-making; they mobilize a functionally distinct
System 2 for more considered or “rational” decisions.
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Pardo & Allen, supra note 162, at 225.

164

Id. at 226.

165

Id. at 230; see also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521 (1991).

44

Decisions achieved via one system are not necessarily better than those achieved
by the other; both forms of decision-making have strengths and weaknesses. However,
empirical research demonstrates that rapid System 1 decisions are highly inaccurate
when subjects rely on intuition about subjects in which they do not have deep
experience. 166

This is troubling, because most daily decision-making could be

described as System 1; yet, most of the decisions one must reach in a legal context are
outside of the ordinary experience of decision-makers. . Where intuitive decisionmaking is not grounded in experience or expertise, but instead informed by received
cultural stories and “common sense,” it tends to recapitulate misinformation and
stereotype. Such research suggests, depressingly, most people’s intuitions are wrong
most of the time — even though, to the decision-maker, the intuitive decision feels so
right.
Mobilizing the language of narrative theory and of behavioral economics,
Professor Griffin argues that behavioral economics research confirms the ways in which
narrative has a significant effect on fact-finding.167 Narrative expectations, she argues,
“provide[] a deep structure inside the courtroom just as [they do] outside of it . . . .”168
This is because judges and jurors exhibit “confirmation bias” — that is, the tendency to
“interpret evidence in a fashion that supports existing preferences, beliefs, expectations,
and theories.”169 Further, in “moments of uncertainty,” judges and jurors (like all
people faced with complex or uncertain decisions) display “belief perseverance”; belief
perseverance makes them “more likely to doubt evidence that conflicts with a
preexisting paradigm and to interpret what is ambiguous as consistent with that
belief.”170 Yet, such decision-makers feel that they have come to accurate, factual
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decisions, rejecting that “implicit emotional response[s]” could affect them as
“source[s] of prejudice.”171
These accounts — narrative, abductive, and behavioral economic — about how
cognitive processes shape evidence law and trial process share a fundamental
premise: 172 Background expectations about the nature of the world and people’s
behavior shape what decision-makers credit as proof, how they weigh such proof, and
the conclusions that they draw from such proof. These theories are all formalized ways
of stating that people (a) reject as implausible that which conflicts with what they
believe they know; and (b) seek to construct accounts from evidence that comport with
their beliefs “about what typically happens in the world.”173 And rightly so: It would be
impossible to navigate the world without relying on background expectations. Yet,
unstated background expectations can also lead to systematic prejudices and errors, as
the next Section will explore.
B.

“Soft” Practices of Evidence Law Encode Bias

While reliance on story and archetype are not inherently objectionable and may
be unavoidable, it is important to attend to where narrative operates and to its particular
content. “Adjudication produces institutionalized meaning from evidence”; thus it is
important to examine “constructs and procedures” that facilitate or inhibit the accuracy
of the legal process.174 Indeed, evidence law and practice is rife with examples of the
ways in which background expectations distort the fact-finding process and lead
decision-makers astray. Just a few include the common bias in favor of the reliability of
— and, hence, both admissibility and weight accorded to — eye witness
identifications,175 the correlation between a witness’s confidence in a memory and the
2098, 2099 (1979) (“[J]udgments about the validity, reliability, relevance, and sometimes even the
meaning of proffered evidence are biased by the apparent consistency of that evidence with the
perceiver's theories and expectations.”)).
171
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accuracy of that memory,176 and the disproportionate credibility decision-makers assign
to forensic sciences (the so-called “CSI effect”).177
The chronic pain claimant currently faces high degrees of skepticism — she is
“the girl who cried pain.”178 But this, too, is likely to change as greater understanding
of the facts of chronic pain diseases spread through legal and general culture. Judicial
and continuing legal education, and the use of expert witnesses to educate juries (and
judges) within the courtroom, can change the normative and factual expectations the
participants within these systems.
Adjudicators’ skepticism of or hostility toward chronic pain claimants may
arises in some part from a pre-scientific vision of pain as emotional dysfunction, which
emerged from a historical literature that few readers today would recognize as medical
or scientific: the “anecdata” of the psychoanalytic case history, like the Anna O. case
discussed in Part I, which are an often highly unreliable narrative form. These tropes
continue to be peddled today: Even a cursory Amazon.com search reveals dozens of
popular books extoling the premise that a person who adjusts her attitude and
acknowledges her emotions will free herself of persistent chronic pain — in as little as
one day! 179 Similarly, there is an industry of defense experts that supports this
relationship.180
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Contemporary pain researchers acknowledge the essential interrelationship of
one’s emotional life and the life of the body, but not in this magical, mind-over-matter
manner.181 Along with rejecting hysteria as the etiology of chronic pain, mainstream
pain scientists similarly make short shrift of previously popular ideas like “secondary
gain,” the increasingly-discredited notion that people with long-term, unexplained
chronic pain unconsciously exaggerate or manufacture their pain because they enjoy the
status or attention or other intangible benefits that come to them by virtue of being
disabled.182
Emotion and pain are related in important ways. First and foremost, pain creates
a negative emotional experience (if we perceived it as a positive experience, it would be
pleasure!).183 Chronic pain has emotional consequences as sufferers miss out on living
the lives they had or wish they could have; social isolation, loss of work, loss of
income, and, of course, constant suffering, lead to understandable emotional distress.184
Chronic pain compromises the brain’s cognitive and affective functioning, creating
cognitive and emotional difficulties as a side effect of the pain syndrome.185 Depressed
181
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mood and stress can augment the experience of pain, while pleasurable and distracting
activities, and strong social support, can moderate pain.186
Yet, the one way in which emotion and chronic pain most frequently are not
related is the one embedded in our legal system: That chronic pain is predominantly a
form of hysteria in which emotionally-disturbed people unconsciously generate the
experience of pain. The next section proposes ways in which this new understanding of
chronic pain, and of the relationship between chronic pain and emotion, should reform
evidentiary doctrines and practices related to chronic pain.
C.

New “Soft” Evidentiary Norms for Adjudicators and Fact-Finders

A new set of norms about chronic pain ought to be incorporated into the legal
system, to unseat the pejorative and medically outmoded premises built into the SSDI
regime,

judicial

interpretations

of

SSDI

regulations,

and

decisions-makers’

presumptions in non-SSDI cases. This section presents a new, suggested set of default
norms.
From a rebuttable presumption of hysteria or fraud to a neutral presumption.
The first and most important normative shift around chronic pain starts with baseline
presumptions. Although not universal, a dominant presumption is that the chronic pain
claimant is mentally ill or is fabricating the claim. In place of this pejorative norm, with
its lingering Freudianism, there ought to be a neutral presumption that the pain claimant,
like any other disability or tort claimant, may or may not be credible and needs to prove
her case.
Chronic pain is not a form of mental illness. Chronic pain is not a mental illness
and typically does not result from mental illness. Depressive illness and cognitive
impairment more often follow the development of a chronic pain condition than precede
it.

In a subset of chronic pain patients, a history of trauma may have created a

biological predisposition to develop chronic pain in response to an injury. Whether a
claimant had this latent predisposition does not make the condition the claimant’s fault,
nor does it mean that he or she can fix the subsequently-developed pain condition
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through addressing the emotional issue. Rather, it makes these individuals the classic
vulnerable victims or “glass jaw” plaintiffs.
Mental illness as a direct cause of chronic pain can occur but it is exceedingly
rare. Psychogenic pain conditions do occur. However, as the DSM-IV cautions, these
conditions are rare and unusual. According to the DSM, psychiatrists (and others)
should be reluctant to diagnose psychogenic pain or somatoform disorder in the absence
of clear indicators that the chronic pain condition does not result primarily from a nonpsychiatric medical condition.
Chronic pain cannot be braved away with a positive attitude.

Culturally

received stories of people being miraculously cured of their chronic pain through
identifying and resolving an emotional conflict are just that — stories. They may in
some cases be true stories, just as some religious believers in fact experience remission
of disease symptoms through faith healing. Yet, such anecdotes do not prove that
chronic pain can be talked away through psychotherapy or braved away through
positive thinking any more than faith healing stories suggest that hospitals should be
converted into churches.
Chronic pain fluctuates, and chronic pain conditions can be relapsing-remitting.
People with chronic pain conditions have good days and bad days. These good days
and bad days may relate to the lifecourse of the disease (unexplained but disease-typical
variations over time) or to patient-specific or external factors, including degree of social
support, physical therapy, medical treatment, financial and other pressures, and overall
mood.187 Decision-makers should understand that the presence of good days does not
mean the person is faking it on the bad days, and instead should expect to see some
variation.

This understanding of chronic pain as inherently variable, and

relapsing/remitting, is contrary to the Fifth Circuit standard that, to be legally disabling,
chronic pain must be “constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic
treatment.”188
Paternalism toward chronic pain patients is inappropriate and anti-therapeutic.
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Decision-makers adjudicating chronic pain claims at times adopt a questionable
paternalism toward chronic pain claimants. One such notion is that attention and
compensation perpetuate the claimant’s pain by “rewarding” the pain behavior. This
belief leads to the conclusion that chronic pain claimants need to be denied
compensation as a kind of “tough love” that will help them move on with their lives.
There are three problems with this approach, one of which is factual and two of which
are legal. The factual issue is that there is no evidence that the reward theory is true,
and a lot of evidence that it is not.189 The first legal issue is that this approach violates
horizontal equity: As to no other condition or category of claimants do decision-makers
argue that they ought to withhold otherwise merited compensation for the good of the
claimant. The second legal-theoretical problem with the reward theory relates to the
institutional role of the decision-maker. Judges have an important and appropriate role
in interpreting law and regulations, and in developing the common law. Doing so is not
judicial activism, it is judicial performance. However, if a law or regulation provides
that a disability is compensable, or tort law provides that a negligently caused
impairment is compensable, then it is inappropriate activism for the judge to treat
differently one category of disabilities or impairments based on beliefs about what
would be good for the plaintiff/claimant.
IV.

CHRONIC PAIN NEUROIMAGING AND “HARD” EVIDENCE PRACTICES: THE CASE
FOR LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY OF PAIN NEUROIMAGING
Moving on from “soft” evidentiary considerations involving norms and

narratives, this Part considers “hard” or black-letter legal questions about the
admissibility of expert evidence concerning chronic pain that emerges from pain
neuroimaging studies.

Neuroimaging, and testimony about such neuroimaging,

concerning the ways chronic pain changes the brain ought to be admissible in suitable
cases. Such evidence will not be relevant in every case involving a chronic pain claim.
The best and most valid uses of such evidence will be to inform the fact-finders’ and
adjudicators’ understanding of what chronic pain is and to assist them in their
189
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evaluation of the rest of the evidence. Aggregate neuroimaging evidence showing how
chronic pain changes the brain can educate the fact finder, first, about the reality of
chronic pain diseases and, second, about how a particular chronic pain condition may
on average affect sufferers’ brains and behavior. It should not, however, be admitted to
prove or disprove the presence of chronic pain in any individual claimant, as
neuroimaging techniques are not sufficiently reliable at the individual level.
Claims involving chronic pain may arise in federal, state, or administrative
proceedings.

This Part opens by briefly describing the federal, state, and Social

Security administrative standards for admitting expert medical and scientific evidence.
These evidentiary regimes differ in important ways; they vary as to whether they
prescribe specific tests for the qualifications of experts and expert evidence, and, if so,
as to the tests they prescribe. Yet the touchstone of admissibility across all of them is
the same: Whether the evidence is relevant, and whether its relevance outweighs its
potential to mislead or confuse the finder of fact. Thus, while recognizing the ways in
which these evidentiary regimes vary, this Part offers largely consistent proposals for
what types of pain neuroimaging evidence should, and should not, be admitted in
federal, state, or SSA proceedings.
A.

Federal, State, and Administrative Admissibility Standards

Federal, state, and SSA rules for the admissibility of expert scientific and
medical evidence are designed to admit evidence that is relevant and helpful to the fact
finder, and to exclude evidence that is not. These three regimes may be characterized as
falling on a continuum, on which the SSA is the most liberal in admitting medical and
scientific evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence occupy a middle ground, and state
evidence laws modeled on the Frye standard are the most restrictive. Despite their
differences, however, relevant neuroimaging evidence offered to educate the finder of
fact about various pain conditions ought to satisfy each of these admissibility standards.
This short section describes standards for expert evidence under each of these regimes
and then applies these standards to evaluate the admissibility of this type of evidence.
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1. Federal Rules of Evidence
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 702 govern the admissibility of expert
evidence, including scientific and medical evidence.190 Rule 401 provides that all
relevant evidence is admissible, unless it is subject to some special exclusion; evidence
is not admissible if it is not relevant.191 Once a court has determined that proffered
expert evidence is relevant, it evaluates its admissibility under Rule 702, which governs
expert evidence. The touchstone of admissibility under Rule 702 is whether the expert
evidence will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.”192 If a matter is within the experience and understanding of jurors, expert
evidence on that matter is not admissible because of the concern that the expert will
usurp the function of the jury.

If a matter is outside of the understanding and

experience of the typical juror, and it is material to the determination of some aspect of
the case, a court may admit expert testimony to enable jurors come to an informed
conclusion about the matter.193
After a court determines that expert evidence may aid the jury, the burden is on
the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that it satisfies threshold requirements for
set forth in Rule 702. Rule 702, which incorporates standards that the Supreme Court
developed in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 194 requires that the expert
testimony be “based upon sufficient facts or data” and that it be “the product of reliable
principles and methods.”195 Finally, the expert must have “applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.”196 Even evidence based on reliable principles
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and methods, though, must be excluded if “there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion offered.”197
The precise meaning of these requirements has given rise to a large literature
and some significant dispute.198 The rule itself offers no guidance on what makes a
principle or method “reliable,” nor what makes facts and data “sufficient.” Further, the
rule is entirely silent on how a court ought to determine whether the principles and
methods — even if reliable and sufficient — are adequately related to the expert’s
conclusion. Daubert lists a few illustrative factors that a trial judge may consider to
assess the reliability and sufficiency of expert evidence. These include whether the “the
theory or technique” “has been subjected to peer review,” whether it has “a known or
potential error rate,” and “whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a
relevant scientific community.”199
As Professor Eleanor Swift has noted, this standard grants wide latitude to trial
judges as gatekeepers of scientific evidence.200 Scholars and judges agree that it tends
toward liberal admissibility: Many judges engage in limited independent evaluation of
medical, scientific or other expert evidence and instead trust the adversary process to
test evidence through a “battle of the experts.”201
2. State Rules of Evidence
State evidence codes, like the Federal Rules of Evidence, also condition the
admissibility of any evidence on its relevance: Relevant evidence is presumptively
admissible while irrelevant evidence is not.202 However, many states apply a standard
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to expert evidence that is more restrictive than the federal standard, excluding
otherwise-relevant evidence if it has not gained “general acceptance” within the
relevant expert community.203 This general acceptance standard, first articulated in
Frye v. United States nearly a century ago,204 remains in use to some degree in many
states.205 Different states, however, apply Frye somewhat differently: Some adhere to
Frye strictly, while others merely consider general acceptance as one factor in the
admissibility determination. In many states that ostensibly follow Frye, judges engage
in a broader reliability inquiry similar to the inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence
702.206
To determine whether expert evidence has gained general acceptance under Frye
or a Frye-like test, courts principally look at whether the evidence itself or the
techniques and methods from which it is derived have achieved particular status in the
relevant expert community. Courts may look at whether the evidence is considered
uncontroversial within the research field, or whether the evidence or methods on which
it is based appear in textbooks and major treatises. This inquiry is significantly more
conservative than under the federal rule, because scientific and medical consensus can
take decades to achieve, if consensus emerges at all.

Additionally, the Frye test

provides a different role for the judge: Under the federal rule, the judge must determine
the reliability of expert evidence; under Frye, the judge must delegate that

EVID. CODE § 210 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of
a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that
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less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).
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determination to experts in the field by establishing whether they would find the
evidence acceptable.
3. SSA Administrative Proceedings
In administrative proceedings, the administrative law judge (ALJ) is both trier of
law and finder of fact, much like a state or federal judge in a bench trial.207 All agency
proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).208 The APA
authorizes agencies to take evidence in their proceedings; yet, it does not provide rules
of evidence. Instead, agencies promulgate their own evidentiary rules and practices.
This short section focuses exclusively on the evidentiary rules and procedures of the
Social Security Administration because of that agency’s role in adjudicating disability
claims.
In SSA disability determinations, ALJs’ evidentiary determinations are
governed by a flexible, general standard rather than by a code equivalent to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.209 Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.350 states that the claimant has “the right
to appear and present evidence,”210 and that “[t]he administrative law judge may receive
any evidence at the hearing that he or she believes relates to your claim.”211 Section
405.331 of the same title instructs the claimant to “submit with your request for hearing
any evidence that you have available to you.”212 Evidence “must be complete and
detailed enough” for an adjudicator to determine the existence of the disability and its
duration and severity.213 Additionally, Section 405.1(c)(2) states that the SSA “also
will consider any relevant information that we have in our records.”214
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Beyond these very general evidentiary provisions set forth in the federal
regulations, the SSA has promulgated guidance for claimants in its Bluebook. The
Bluebook instructs claimants that a disability claim requires medical evidence from
treating physicians,215 but that the SSA also accepts and reviews medical evidence from
other “acceptable medical source[s].”216 An “acceptable medical source” includes a
“nonexamining source,” meaning a “physician, psychologist, or other acceptable
medical source who has not examined you but provides a medical or other opinion in
your case.”217 The Bluebook indicates in broad terms the kinds of expert evidence that
a claimant may submit. Yet, unlike the federal and state rules, it does not establish any
criteria relating to the quality of the expert evidence. These provisions constitute the
entirety of the SSA regulations concerning the admissibility of evidence in disability
proceedings, a stark contrast to the detailed federal and state rules of evidence and all
their resulting interpretive case law.
4. Common Features of These Regimes: Relevance and Reliability
Despite

the

formal

differences

between

these

regimes,

218

determinations under all of these regimes share a common foundation:

evidence
They are

grounded in relevance; and, to varying extents, they require reliability and helpfulness
to the finder of fact.219 Because of these similarities, the admissibility of neuroimaging
evidence ought to be substantially similar in federal, state, and administrative
proceedings.
All of these regimes depart from the presumption that all relevant evidence is
admissible. Federal and state practice, although balanced in favor of the admissibility of
all relevant evidence under Rule 401, do permit some relevant evidence to be excluded:
Relevant evidence may be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, or has the
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tendency to mislead or confuse the jury.220 Relevant evidence also may be excluded if
it constitutes impermissible hearsay or if it violates constitutional requirements, like the
right of confrontation.221 The SSA regime admits relevant evidence more liberally, as it
has no special exclusions equivalent to the federal and state exclusionary rules.222
Finally, the regulations impose an affirmative obligation on the SSA to search its own
records for any relevant evidence and to bring such evidence forward in a proceeding.223
Federal and state evidence law specify criteria designed to assist the judge in
determining whether proffered expert evidence is reliable. The SSA regime appears to
differ from the federal and state rules in that it does not set forth criteria for evaluating
the reliability of expert evidence.

Yet it, too, implicitly contains a reliability

requirement: Evidence that is not at reliable cannot be relevant, since that which is
false, misleading or of indeterminate reliability cannot aid the search for truth.
Beyond relevance and reliability, to the extent that those criteria differ, federal
and state rules also limit expert evidence to that which is “helpful to the trier of fact” by
informing them on subjects outside of jurors’ ordinary competence. 224 As with
reliability, the SSA standard appears to be silent on this point yet implicitly mirrors the
federal and state rules. Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.350 states in the conditional form that the
“[t]he administrative law judge may receive any evidence … that he or she believes
relates to your claim.”225 Since the judge is vested with discretion to determine what
relevant evidence to include or exclude, this suggests he or she may determine which
evidence will help to adjudicate the claim.
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The broad similarity between these three evidence regimes argues that expert
neuroscientific evidence, including evidence derived from pain neuroimaging, ought to
be similarly admissible in federal, state, and SSA proceedings. States that follow Frye
closely will apply the most restrictive standard.

Yet, rigorous pain neuroimaging

evidence offered for aggregate or educative purposes ought to pass even the Frye test in
many cases.
Although there are differences between evidence regimes that will lead to
admissibility differences at the margin, under all three regimes aggregate neuroimaging
evidence of chronic pain ought to be admissible if offered for a relevant purpose. The
following section will propose use-cases in which pain neuroimaging could be relevant
and in which it likely ought to be admissible under each evidence regime. It also sets
forth the case for why neuroimaging currently ought to be admissible only for aggregate
purposes, while pointing to a future in which scans of individual claimants may be
sufficiently rigorous to merit admission.
B.
Recommendations on the Admissibility of Pain Neuroimaging Evidence
This Section first proposes the major categories in which neuroscience-based
evidence about chronic pain conditions may be relevant. It then suggests what kinds of
neuroscience evidence may be sufficiently reliability to gain admissibility under all
three evidence regimes, and what kinds of evidence, or what claims relative to chronic
pain neuroscience evidence, may not be sufficiently reliable to pass one or more of the
federal, state, and SSA evidentiary thresholds. This focus on relevance first, and then
reliability, mirrors the architecture of the Federal Rules, whose drafters logically
suggested that relevance precedes all other considerations.
1. Pain Neuroimaging Is Sufficiently Reliable to Be Admitted for Some Purposes
Pain neuroimaging evidence should be admissible in certain cases to help the
finder of fact understand the nature of chronic pain diseases, to demonstrate general
features of chronic pain diseases, and to show the average impact of such diseases on
the neurological function of sufferers. Testimony grounded in structural and functional
neuroimaging of chronic pain, when offered for these limited purposes, should satisfy
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the federal Daubert and state Frye standards (with some exceptions), as well as the
more permissive relevance and reliability standards in SSA proceedings.
There are several strong uses-cases for aggregate neuroimaging evidence in
cases where chronic pain is at issue, all of which fall into the category of expert-aseducator.

Neuroscience-based evidence relating to chronic pain could offered as

relevant to matters within the following three general categories: (a) the biology of
chronic pain; (b) the cognitive and affective effects and implications of chronic pain;
and (c) general debiasing, that is, correcting implicit biases or mistaken inferences
adjudicators or jurors may draw from their own experience. Given the nearly limitless
variety of facts in the world, and advocates’ creativity in working with them, though,
these categories do not capture all potentially relevant uses of such evidence. The
arguments in this section draw on and incorporate the scientific material presented in
Part II, supra; accordingly, the supporting research is not repeated here.
a. Relevance Case: General Biology of Chronic Pain
Evidence grounded in neuroimaging, including brain images themselves, could
help explain to ALJs and to jurors features of chronic pain that may be puzzling or
counterintuitive to the non-expert. There are four major concepts about chronic pain
that decision-makers should because they may be important to adjudicating a case.
These four concepts are outside of the experience of lay jurors and ALJs; indeed, they
likely are outside the experience even of physicians who do not practice in the chronic
pain area. These concepts track those introduced in Part III.C, concerning the role of
neuroimaging in changing norms, but here are not limited to disability and apply to any
case involving chronic pain claims.
First, experts may inform decision-makers about how brain-based processes
modulate pain experience, so that two different individuals with the same or similar
peripheral injury may experience markedly different degrees and durations of pain.226
Such evidence would go to explaining the “excess” pain that some individuals
experience.
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understanding how pain may persist after the apparent resolution of the original injury
or disease.227
Second, brain-based processes can cause a pain condition even in the absence of
a discernable peripheral injury, that is, “pain without lesion.”228 The existence of this
kind of pain is the most counter-intuitive to non-specialists and may be likely to be
adjudged as fraudulent or as a form of factitious disorder.229 Expert testimony can
explain the neurological mechanisms that give rise to such pain. It can also help
construct a clinically realistic portrait of these kinds of diseases to aid the decisionmaker in coming to an accurate assessment of a particular claimant or plaintiff.
Third, although all chronic pain conditions will share some neurological features,
distinct chronic pain conditions present distinct patterns of brain involvement. 230
Evidence on this point can aid decision-makers in understanding the reality of pain
conditions. If an opposing party introduces testimony to the effect that certain pain
conditions, like fibromyalgia or chronic headache, lack a biological basis, rebuttal
testimony about the specific neurobiology of such conditions would become relevant.
Finally, chronic pain results in structural remodeling of the brain, although
permanence or reversibility of these changes remain under investigation. Testimony on
the degree and duration of impairment could go to damages in a tort case.
b. Relevance Case: Cognitive and Affective Effects of Chronic Pain
Findings from neuroimaging, along with more traditional kinds of evidence, can
help instruct the finder of fact about the cognitive and emotional impacts of chronic
pain. These impacts are not ephemeral nor epiphenomenal: They are part of the pain
disorder. 231

Cognitive and affective issues arise directly from the brain-based

impairments of chronic pain conditions.232 Pain neuroimaging and related research
show how specific cognitive and affective regions of the brain involved in pain
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processing become functionally and structurally altered by pain. As discussed infra, in
Part III.B., research suggests that, when a chronic pain sufferer and a typical person
perform the same task in the lab, the pain sufferer needs to recruit different and
additional brain regions to do the same work; the total “load” becomes higher for him or
her. By analogy, chronic pain impairs performance on a decision task similarly to how
texting interferes with driving. The difference is that the chronic pain sufferer cannot
“put down the phone.”
Cognitive impairments may affect a claimant’s ability to work at the pre-illness
cognitive level. The affective impairments may constitute a compensable harm in tort,
as part of the overall evaluation of damages. Affective impairments also go to the
question of hedonic adaptability.233 Unlike many other forms of disability, chronic pain
is unfortunately non-adaptable: The famous behavioral economist Dan Ariely, who had
an accident that left him with third-degree burns over most of his body, has written
eloquently about the non-adaptability of chronic pain.234 The reasons for pain’s low
hedonic adaptability are multiple, including that pain hurts! Neuroimaging revealing
how pain commandeers portions of the brain’s emotional systems may provide an
additional explanation: Mood cannot fully recover where the condition itself interferes
with mood regulation. This could be relevant in a tort case to show future damages or
to rebut a defense argument for limited damages grounded in hedonic adaptability.
c. Relevance Case: Debiasing
The experience of at least some degree of pain is universal. Pain thus would
seem to be within the knowledge and experience of the ordinary juror. However, this
very experience may mislead jurors. Chronic pain is not like acute pain. Jurors who
have experienced acute pain thus may reason wrongly about chronic pain specifically
233
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because of they are likely to try to understand chronic pain based on their own
experience of acute pain. This creates a role for the expert witness as an educator about
the nature of this misunderstood set of conditions.
Courts have been mixed in their reception of experts as pure educators, as in the
case of experts who testify about the fallibility of eyewitness identification.235 Some
courts have permitted experts to teach the jury about the fallibility of eyewitnesses,
reasoning that such testimony is necessary to debias jurors who otherwise will give too
much weight to eyewitness identification evidence. 236

Other courts have held,

conversely, that scientific evidence concerning visual recall and identification is not a
proper subject for expert testimony because it is within the ordinary experience of
jurors.237
Testimony educating the jury about general features of chronic pain or specific
chronic pain conditions could face similar skepticism among courts. However, expert
testimony about chronic pain is readily distinguishable from education about visual
identification and recall. Although, as with visual recall, every juror will have had
experience with pain, most will not have had experience with serious chronic pain. This
places chronic pain further outside the scope of juror competence than eyewitness
identification. If the jury does contain a member who has had serious chronic pain, it
would be more appropriate for the rest of the jury to be educated by parties’ experts
than for there to be, in effect, a covert expert in the jury room who has not been subject
to adversarial examination.
2. Neuroimaging Should Not (Yet?) Be Admissible to Prove Individual Pain
Neuroimaging techniques, particularly fMRI, should not be admissible at this
point under federal or state standards to prove or disprove the presence of a chronic pain
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condition in any individual. The major concerns that render such evidence currently
inadmissible are identical to those that must be resolved in order to allow for future
admissibility. Moreover, these problems currently are common to all individual, nonaggregate evidentiary uses of all fMRI and much structural brain imaging, not just the
neuroimaging of chronic pain. These are, in this author’s view, the problems of:
baseline norming;238 reverse inference problems; 239 inter- and intra-subject variation; 240
high cost; 241 and counter-measures (“tricking the scanner”).242 . Each of these problems
relating to the validity of scans for individual pain diagnosis is scientifically nontrivial.
However, the breathtaking pace of innovation in neuroscience and in information
processing would make it foolhardy to say “never.”
Even if future neuroimaging protocols reduce the risk of these interpretive
pitfalls, the legal system still should not develop a default expectation that parties
introduce such evidence in all chronic pain cases. Such evidence is costly relative to
other evidence that might adequately resolve the case. A preference for scans might
prejudice decision-makers against claimants who cannot afford the technique or whose
condition cannot reliably be discerned that way. This could create a CSI effect, wherein
jurors or adjudicators expect a party to produce a type of scientific evidence simply
because it exists,243 and draw an adverse inference against the party if such evidence is
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not offered.244 Currently and in the foreseeable future, it would be undesirable for
scientific, economic, and normative reasons for adjudicators and fact finders to develop
an expectation that neuroimaging should be introduced to prove pain.
CONCLUSION
At the same time that chronic pain is pervasive across important areas of law,
the law incorporates deep bias and confusion about what chronic pain consists of and
even whether it is “real.” Generations of patients and courtroom claimants with chronic
pain have been told that their condition is “all in their heads.” Although the medical
establishment is changing rapidly in light of new pain science, legal actors still
frequently dismiss people who complain of chronic pain as “head cases.”

Legal

doctrines, including judge-made law interpreting the Social Security Disability
regulations, encode these pejorative characterizations, which are grounded in part in
skepticism about pain, an invisible and largely unverifiable condition, and in part in a
Freudian-inflected construction of the chronic pain sufferer as the modern-day hysteric.
Although not providing a pain-o-meter that will separate the honest pain sufferer
from the malingering fraudster, neuroimaging and other technologies can play a positive
role in helping to change norms, to inform interpretation of existing laws and
regulations, and contribute to establishing new legal standards. These technologies may
never produce definitive measurements of pain its and associated distress. And, they
may never surmount the problem of pain’s incommensurability across subjects. Yet,
they can shed light on mechanisms of pain chronification, the biological correlates of
chronic pain, and the neurological bases of chronic pain without lesion. This should
allow fact-finders and decision-makers to recognize chronic pain in the courtroom,
should allow judges to better interpret administrative regulations relating to chronic
pain, and should lead to the revision of the Social Security Disability regulations to
provide greater guidance on when a person may be disabled by chronic pain.
The ability to partially measure and objectify pain both will and will not resolve
difficult legal questions that turn on pain’s presence and intensity in individual cases.
This is because, even if neuroimaging could validate pain’s presence and severity
perfectly, legal actors still would need to determine when pain, and what kinds of pain,
244
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constitute a legally-redressable impairment. As neuroimaging develops, the law will
confront ever more challenging questions in this regard, such as whether it can sustain
its different treatment of physical and emotional pain, which also has neurological
correlates. Indeed, pain may be the phenomenon that requires law to rethink or even
abandon its current dualism between physical and emotional harms. Neuroimaging
seems technical, and is technological. But in providing a window into the brain and the
subjective experiences the brain generates, it challenges existing norms about many
categories of subjective phenomena and goes to the theoretical heart of legal doctrines
about body and mind.
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